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INTEREST DEDUCTION 
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There are several sacred cows in the Internal Revenue Code,
1
 but perhaps 
none quite as sacrosanct as the home mortgage interest deduction.
2
 U.S. 
Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin has characterized the mortgage interest 
deduction as so beloved by the American people that it is “kind of like apple 
                                                                                                                 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Creighton University School of Law. Special thanks go 
to Christopher Nuñez. The usual disclaimers apply. 
 1. Sacred Cow, POL. DICTIONARY, https://politicaldictionary.com/words/sacred-cow/ 
(last visited May 9, 2018) (“A program, policy, or person that is regarded as being beyond 
attack or untouchable. The term references the status held by cows in Hindu culture, where 
the cow is regarded as a sacred animal. In American politics, Social Security has been 
considered a sacred cow because it is so politically popular that most politicians would never 
support ending the program.”); see also Richard Rubin, Talking Taxes: The Sacred Cows of 
the Tax Code, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 4, 2017, 5:30 A.M. ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
talking-taxes-the-sacred-cows-of-the-tax-code-1507109402 (referencing other sacred cow 
tax provisions, including “employer-sponsored health insurance, state and local taxes, . . . 
and charitable donations”). 
 2. James A. Fellows, Tax Issues, 41 REAL EST. L.J. 338, 338 (2012) (“There is 
probably no tax deduction more sacred to individual taxpayers than 
the deduction for interest paid on their home mortgages. Advocating the elimination of 
this deduction is tantamount to political suicide, much like advocating the reform of 
Medicare and Social Security payments. Oddly, the U.S. remains the only developed country 
that allows the deduction unconditionally. Nearly all the others have abolished 
the deduction. Only the Netherlands and Switzerland allow the deduction, but both countries 
first require taxpayers to increase taxable income by a percentage of the value of the 
property, a so-called ‘notional rental value,’ thereby negating much of 
the deduction's value.”). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
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pie.”3 It is not an overstatement to suggest that a threat to this deduction has 
been perceived as a direct assault upon the middle-class dream of 
homeownership:
4
 in a 2011 Gallup survey, 61% of Americans were opposed 
to the elimination of the deduction, even when it was framed in the context of 
a tax rate or deficit reduction.
5
 Reform of the home mortgage interest 
deduction has been described as the third rail of tax reform, in that “touching 
the [mortgage interest deduction] is not just treasonous but ruinous.”6 That is, 
until December 22, 2017 when the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) 
was enacted.  
A deduction for interest paid on personal indebtedness, including 
mortgage interest, has a long history that dates back to the inception of 
modern U.S. tax law—one of the original itemized deductions allowed under 
the 1913 Revenue Act.
7
 When all other forms of personal interest were 
rendered nondeductible, the deduction of home mortgage interest was 
explicitly blessed by the Revenue Act of 1986, with the overlay of the 
Revenue Act of 1987. The legislation rendered personal interest 
nondeductible while carving out an exception for the deduction of qualified 
residence interest—specifically, interest associated with up to “$1 million of 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Prashant Gopal & Joe Light, 25 Million Americans Could Find Mortgage Tax Break 
Useless Under Trump’s Plan, BLOOMBERG (May 16, 2017, 4:00 AM CDT), https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-16/trump-tax-plan-would-make-mortgage-
break-worthless-for-millions. 
 4. See G.I., Don’t Defend This Deduction, ECONOMIST (Sept. 13, 2010), https://www. 
economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/09/mortgage_interest_deduction [hereinafter Don’t 
Defend This Deduction] (“I JUST got an email from Nancy Pelosi's press office lambasting 
John Boehner for wanting to eliminate ‘tax relief benefiting millions of middle-class 
families’ by scrapping the mortgage interest deduction.”); David Streitfeld & Megan Thee-
Brenan, Despite Fears, Owning Home Retains Allure, Poll Shows, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/30/business/30poll.html?scp=1&sq=homeowner 
ship&st=cse (“Nearly nine in 10 Americans say homeownership is an important part of the 
American dream, according to the latest New York Times/CBS News poll. . . . [A]nd almost 
no one favors discontinuing the mortgage tax deduction, a prized middle-class benefit that 
has been featured on some budget-cutting proposals.”). 
 5. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Oppose Eliminating Income Tax Deductions, GALLUP 
(Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147125/americans-oppose-eliminating-income-
tax-deductions.aspx. In a poll conducted by the New York Times and CBS News, more than 
90% of Americans were opposed to the elimination of the deduction. Streitfeld & Thee-
Brenan, supra note 4.  
 6. Dennis J. Ventry Jr., The Fake Third Rail of Tax Reform 181 (UC Davis Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 289, 2012). 
 7. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss2/2
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acquisition indebtedness” and $100,000 of home equity indebtedness8 on the 
taxpayer’s primary and secondary residence.9 Any interest paid in excess of 
these upward limits became nondeductible personal interest.
10
 These rules 
changed when the TCJA was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives 
and Senate on December 20, 2017, and signed into law by President Trump 
on December 22, 2017.
11
 Taxpayers with existing mortgages (incurred before 
December 15, 2017) remain grandfathered under old law, and may deduct 
interest on a total of $1 million debt for a first and second home. For new 
homeowners, however, the $1 million limit drops to $750,000. Interest 
attributable to home equity indebtedness is nondeductible for all homeowners 
as of January 1, 2018.
12
 These rules expire on December 31, 2025, at which 
time limits will revert to pre-TCJA levels.  
Economists generally agree that the home mortgage interest deduction is a 
terrible idea, and so the notion of elimination or substantial revision of the 
home mortgage interest deduction is not without substantial support from a 
tax policy perspective.
13
 The home mortgage interest deduction is vulnerable 
                                                                                                                 
 8. William T. Mathias, Curtailing the Economic Distortions of the Mortgage Interest 
Deduction, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 43, 47–48 (1996). A home equity loan must be secured 
by the residence and is generally incurred after the taxpayer acquires a home (thereby 
excluding debt used to purchase or construct the home). Id. at 47. Prior to January 1, 2018, 
§§ 163(h)(3)(A)(ii) & (C) provided a deduction for interest paid on home equity 
indebtedness up to $100,000. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, sec. 11043, § 163(h)(3), 
Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054, 2086. 
 9. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 511, § 163 (h)(5)(A)(i)(II), 100 
Stat. 2085, 2248; see also Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-
203, Sec. 10102, § 163(h)(3), 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-384 to -386 (amending I.R.C. § 
163(h)(3)). This law modified the Tax Reform Act of 1986 with regard to qualified 
residence interest. 
 10. H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, pt. 2, at 1031-32 (1987). 
 11. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054. 
 12. I.R.S. News Release IR-2018-32 (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/
newsroom/interest-on-home-equity-loans-often-still-deductible-under-new-law (clarifying 
that under new law, a taxpayer “can often still deduct interest on a home equity loan, home 
equity line of credit (HELOC) or second mortgage, regardless of how the loan is labelled . . . 
[as long as the loan proceeds] are used to buy, build or substantially improve the taxpayer’s 
home that secures the loan”). 
 13. See, e.g., Don’t Defend This Deduction, supra note 4 (“If you must defend a tax 
break, find a different one. The mortgage interest deduction (MID) is truly one of the worst, 
most pernicious features of our income tax code. Not only does it encourage excessive 
investment in homes, it encourages doing it with debt. The MID didn't cause our crisis—
after all, it's been around since 1986 when the deductibility of almost all other types of 
interest was eliminated. But it is symptomatic of our fondness for endless subsidies and 
distortions to promote home ownership, which did ultimately produce our crisis.”); All 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
350 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:347 
 
 
to criticism because it is an example of an upside-down housing subsidy
14—
overwhelmingly benefitting wealthy taxpayers, with little benefit to most 
middle-income taxpayers,
15
 and no benefit to low-income taxpayers.
16
 This is 
a problematic allocation of resources given that the home mortgage interest 
deduction is the largest subsidy offered by the federal government to 
homeowners, and also one of the largest tax expenditures in the Internal 
Revenue Code.
17
 Further, indirectly subsidizing homeownership through the 
                                                                                                                 
Things Considered: Is Tax Deduction for Home Mortgages a Bad Idea?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(Nov. 22, 2009 5:10 PM ET), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId 
=120668836 (suggesting that there are no economists who would claim the mortgage 
interest deduction is good for the economy, other than those who are employed by the 
National Association of Realtors); Andrew Chamberlain, The Case Against the Home 
Mortgage Interest Deduction, TAX FOUND. (Sept. 24, 2005), https://taxfoundation.org/case-
against-home-mortgage-interest-deduction/ (stating that despite the popularity of the home 
mortgage interest deduction, “economists are basically united in their opposition to it”); Max 
Ehrenfreund, There’s Good News for Well-off Homeowners in the GOP Presidential 
Campaign, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (July 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
wonk/wp/2015/07/06/theres-good-news-for-well-off-homeowners-in-the-gop-presidential-
campaign/?utm_term=.c7291edefcc8 (asserting that “many economists say [the mortgage 
interest deduction] is among the biggest and most problematic in the tax code”). 
 14. David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending 
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 977 (2004) (“Upside-down subsidies are created because the 
value of tax deductions increases with the marginal tax rate, so that wealthy individuals with 
high marginal tax rates will receive more for a given deduction than individuals with lower 
incomes and lower marginal tax rates. If one views tax expenditures as equivalent to the 
government handing out money, wealthy individuals get bigger handouts than the poor.”).  
 15. Anthony Randazzo & Dean Stansel, Mortgage Interest Deduction Saves Middle 
Class Taxpayers All Of $51/Month, FORBES (Dec. 18, 2013, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes. 
com/sites/realspin/2013/12/18/mortgage-interest-deduction-saves-middle-class-taxpayers-
all-of-51month/#326ae7e1105c (finding that on average, middle-class homeowners saved 
only $51.25 in taxes per month in 2012 thanks to the mortgage interest deduction). 
 16. See id. A married couple would need a home-loan balance of at least $560,000, see 
infra Part III, tbl. 2, which is more than double the median-priced U.S. home in the United 
States (of $216,000), Gopal & Light, supra note 3 (“U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven 
Mnuchin has taken pains to stress that the Trump administration isn’t out to kill Americans’ 
beloved mortgage-interest tax deduction–but a side effect of the plan could turn it into a perk 
for only the wealthy. President Donald Trump has proposed rewriting the tax code to raise 
the standard federal deduction to a level where about 25 million homeowners would no 
longer take advantage of the century-old break.”). A lower-income taxpayer would be unable 
to benefit from this, for they would be unable to afford the $560,000 mortgage-balance 
threshold. 
 17. Brian J. McCabe, Despite Benefit Disparities, Middle Class Supports Mortgage 
Deduction, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 13, 2011, 4:04 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/ 
despite-benefit-disparities-middle-class-supports-mortgage-deduction/. 
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direct subsidization of debt
18
 normatively deemphasizes the importance of 
equity, stymying economic growth, worsening inequality, and creating 
systemic fragility.
19
  
And though the change to § 163 may not seem significant by its own 
terms, its interaction with other amendments of the Internal Revenue Code 
will result in profound change: the reduction of the home mortgage interest 
cap to $750,000 from $1 million will interact with the provision capping state 
and local property, sales, and income tax at $10,000, and the almost-doubled 
standard deduction. The direct effect will be fewer homeowners itemizing 
their home mortgage interest deduction: an estimated 44% of taxpayers 
received the benefit of the home mortgage interest deduction under prior 
law,
20
 and it is anticipated that this number will drop to less than 15%.
21
 The 
cost of the home mortgage interest deduction (in terms of foregone revenue) 
before the TCJA was estimated by the Joint Committee on Taxation to be 
$83.4 billion (in 2017 for fiscal year 2020),
22
 with a revised estimate post-
TCJA reducing this number to $36.9 billion (in 2018 for fiscal year 2020).
23
 
Notably, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 continues a trend of 
temporary lawmaking—the changes to the home mortgage interest deduction 
expire in eight years unless extended by Congress.
24
 Though the 
                                                                                                                 
 18. The Great Distortion, ECONOMIST (May 16, 2015), https://www.economist.com/ 
news/leaders/21651213-subsidies-make-borrowing-irresistible-need-be-phased-out-great-
distortion (“[A] vast distortion in the world economy is wholly man-made. It is the subsidy 
that governments give to debt.”). 
 19. Id. (“Economies biased towards debt are more prone to crises, because debt imposes 
a rigid obligation to repay on vulnerable borrowers, whereas equity is expressly designed to 
spread losses onto investors.”). 
 20. Svenja Gudell, Tax Reform with $750k Cap on Mortgage Interest Deduction Would 
Leave 1 in 7 U.S. Homes Ineligible, FORBES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
zillow/2017/12/18/tax-reform-with-750k-cap-on-mortgage-interest-deduction-would-leave-
1-in-7-u-s-homes-eligible/#332269365983. 
 21. Id. (stating that the number of homes valuable enough to justify itemizing mortgage 
interest deduction varies dramatically from county to county, and state to state: in 
Washington, D.C. the number drops from 98% to 64%; in Los Angeles, the number drops 
from 94% down to 48%; in the city of Cleveland and some surrounding suburbs, the number 
drops from 21% to 3%). 
 22. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 154TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2016-2020, at 32 (Comm. Print 2017) [hereinafter 
ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES: 2016-2020]. 
 23. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 155TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2017-2021, at 37 (Comm. Print 2018) [hereinafter 
ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES: 2017-2021]. 
 24. Temporary legislation refers simply to legislation that has a beginning date and a 
terminating date. I toyed with more visual or creative alternatives, such as ephemeral 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
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implementation of temporary fiscal policy is certainly not new, the use of 
sweeping temporary-effect tax provisions
25
 truly came into vogue with the 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (TRA 2001).
26
 
The Republicans used the budget reconciliation process to avoid filibuster 
and pass TRA 2001—enacting major tax reform that was stacked with phase-
ins and sunsets to circumvent budget rules.
27
 Additional sunsets were 
included in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, 
which was set to expire on December 31, 2008.
28
 This increased use of 
temporary-effect tax legislation during the administration of George W. Bush 
has been the object of scathing critique,
29
 with a prevailing view that such 
legislation is generally little more than a manipulation that allows the cost of 
legislation to be distorted.
30
  
                                                                                                                 
legislation or deciduous legislation, but decided that the mundane was both concise and 
complete.  
 25. In Professor Yin’s footnotes, the phrase “temporary-effect legislation” is used 
instead of “temporary legislation.” See George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, 
Political Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174 (2009). Temporary tax 
legislation, though temporary in nature, may have cost estimates that exceed the ten-year 
budget window. This Article focuses specifically on tax legislation with budget effects that 
do not extend beyond the ten-year budget window. 
 26. Economic Growth and Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 
38; Frank Fagan, The Fiscal Cliff as Reelection Strategy: Rethinking the Temporary 
Taxation Debate, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 783, 784 (2014) (“At the beginning of 2000, more 
than 100 American tax provisions were scheduled to expire, including some of the 
largest tax cuts in history. Only a decade prior, less than two dozen relatively 
inconsequential provisions were scheduled to expire. The increase from 1990 to 2000 
continued into the following decade: during fiscal year 2011, 251 tax provisions were 
scheduled to expire.”). 
 27. JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, OFF CENTER: THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION 
AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 59-64 (2005). 
 28. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 
Stat. 752.  
 29. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1051-65 
(2011) [hereinafter Kysar, Lasting Legislation]; Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The 
Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335, 338 (2006) 
[hereinafter Kysar, The Sun Also Rises]. 
 30. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 29, at 1054. There are scholars who believe, 
however, to varying degree and with varying applications, that temporary-effect legislation 
may be useful. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247 
(2007); Jason S. Oh, The Pivotal Politics of Temporary Legislation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1055 
(2015) Manoj Viswanathan, Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code: A Critical Evaluation and 
Prescriptions for the Future, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 656 (2007); George K. Yin, Temporary-
Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 
232-34 (2009). 
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The purpose of this Article is to parse this issue further, using the recent 
changes to the home mortgage interest deduction as a framework. In his work 
on renewal certainty of temporary-effect legislation, Professor Jason Oh 
identifies four underlying reasons why legislation is enacted on a temporary 
basis: (1) as a responsive policy tool; (2) to circumvent budgetary and 
procedural restrictions; (3) in response to transitory circumstances, such as a 
legislative response to a natural disaster or the housing crisis; (4) in response 
to strategic concerns.
31
 The focus of this Article is the use of temporary-effect 
legislation for the fourth underlying reason—as a strategic approach to 
retrench a sacred cow tax provision.
32
  
Thus, the thesis is equal parts positive, normative, and prescriptive. The 
advantages of temporary-effect legislation are examined through the lens of 
an entrenched tax expenditure, namely the home mortgage interest deduction. 
This Article models the impact of the home mortgage interest deduction for 
taxpayers at varying income levels, under both prior and current law. The 
models untangle some of the excruciating complexity with which almost any 
tax expenditure operates and provides a powerful opportunity to see the 
deeper problems with this tax expenditure. A problem is illuminated in that 
both the previous and present approaches are broken: a pernicious regressive 
subsidy has been exacerbated, and a drip-feed of upper- and upper-middle-
class welfare benefits continues to be delivered through the Internal Revenue 
Code.
33
 Consequently, this Article explores the anathema of temporariness as 
a retrenchment device to fix this tax expenditure, and balances the negative 
externalities that flow from renewal uncertainty against long-term policy 
implications.  
                                                                                                                 
 31. Oh, supra note 30, at 1075.  
 32. Entrenchment, as a concept, may be either hard or soft. Hard (or formal) legislative 
entrenchment is when legislation explicitly impedes or binds a subsequent legislature, and 
there is considerable scholarly discussion as to whether or not such action is constitutional. 
Soft (or functional) entrenchment, by way of contrast, usually refers to rules or mechanisms 
inherent in the process that are designed to impede (but not technically bind) a subsequent 
legislature (e.g. the filibuster). Michael Doran, Legislative Entrenchment and Federal Fiscal 
Policy, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2018, at 27, 28 (focusing also on another type of 
soft legislative entrenchment: specifically, when policy status quo has developed because of 
popular public opinion and expectations).  
 33. Sixty percent of those who claim the home mortgage interest deduction believe that 
they have never used a government program. Derek Thompson, The Shame of the Mortgage-
Interest Deduction, ATLANTIC (May 14, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/ 
archive/2017/05/shame-mortgage-interest-deduction/526635/ (concluding that “rich 
households can be skeptical of public-housing policies while benefiting from a $71 billion 
annual tax benefit which is, functionally, a public-housing policy for the rich”). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
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A brief overview of housing finance generally is provided in Part I of this 
Article. Part II tracks pre-2018 tax law applicable to home mortgage interest, 
as well as the changes effective on January 1, 2018, and explores the upside-
down way in which homeownership through debt is subsidized under the 
Internal Revenue Code: a tax deduction that misallocates benefits to higher-
earning taxpayers at the expense of lower- and middle-income taxpayers. 
Examples illustrating the way in which the January 1, 2018 changes have 
increased the regressive nature of this deduction are introduced in Part III, 
and the idea of the home mortgage interest deduction as a failure in tax policy 
is unpacked. Part IV discusses the opaque legislative process of introducing 
long-term tax reform through temporary-effect provisions as well as the 
options that face the legislature in 2025 when this legislation expires. The 
ambition of this Article is to evaluate the recent changes to the home 
mortgage interest deduction from a tax policy perspective and to also 
consider the politics and processes that are drivers—and so Part V suggests 
that it is time to pivot. Temporary-effect legislation has created a window 
during which it is feasible to retrench the entrenched home mortgage interest 
deduction from the Internal Revenue Code, with little political cost, and 
replace the deduction with a targeted tax credit to subsidize 
homeownership.
34
 
I. The Landscape of Housing Finance and Homeownership 
in the United States  
The rate of homeownership in the United States reached its peak of 69.2% 
in June 2004.
35
 In 2016, this number decreased to a fifty-year low of 
62.9%—likely the consequence of unaffordability as prices in the housing 
market continue to climb.
36
 Despite the disastrous consequences of the 
                                                                                                                 
 34. It is important to make clear that the references to entrenchment in this Article are to 
functional (or soft) and not formal entrenchment. See Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, 
Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400, 403 (2015) (“[C]onsider Social 
Security, a program that is notorious for its resistance to reform or retrenchment. The 
program is not protected by any legal barrier to repeal or special election rules favoring its 
supporters . . . . Rather, the program mobilized and empowered its defenders to stave off 
subsequent political attacks. Put differently, Social Security is entrenched not formally, but 
functionally. This was no accident.”). 
 35. Prashant Gopal, Homeownership Rate in the U.S. Drops to Lowest Since 1965, 
BLOOMBERG (July 28, 2016, 12:04 PM CDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2016-07-28/homeownership-rate-in-the-u-s-tumbles-to-the-lowest-since-1965. 
 36. Charles Lane, Why the Decline of the Homeownership Rate Is Good News, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-the-decline-of-the-
homeownership-rate-is-good-news/2016/08/03/c6b8bf7c-58d1-11e6-9767-
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rupture of the housing bubble in 2007-2008,
37
 homeownership is alive and 
well in the United States. Support of the American dream of homeownership 
is bipartisan, and Part I of this Article traces the way in which mortgage 
financing and tax treatment has developed to facilitate and incentivize 
ownership.  
The features of the American mortgage have evolved dramatically over the 
past century.
38
 In pre-Depression America,
39
 mortgages were typically 
offered by local institutions to homebuyers who made a large down payment 
(in excess of 30%).
40
 These mortgages were subject to short five- or ten-year 
terms, and most had variable interest rates.
41
 Only interest was paid, and at 
the end of the mortgage term, a lump sum payment (known as a “bullet” 
payment) of the principal came due.
42
 If homeowners did not have the funds 
to make the lump sum payment, as was frequently the case, the homeowner 
refinanced the debt.
43
 The homeowner faced dire consequences if refinancing 
                                                                                                                 
f6c947fd0cb8_story.html?utm_term=.f3226270fa2e (stating that the “U.S. homeownership 
rate has just fallen to its lowest level since the Census Bureau began tracking it in 1965”). 
 37. Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the 
Resulting Credit Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY, no. 1, 2009, at 120, 120, 
http://journals.uvu.edu/index.php/jbi/article/view/211/183 (“On December 1, 2008, the 
National Bureau of Economic Research announced that the economy had entered into a 
recession in December of 2007.”).  
 38. See generally Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in 
Historical and International Context, J. ECON. PERSP. Fall 2005, at 93, http://repository. 
upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=penniur_papers. 
 39. Roger Lowenstein, Who Needs the Mortgage-Interest Deduction?, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG. (Mar. 5, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/05/magazine/who-needs-the-
mortgageinterest-deduction.html (“It was not until the 1920's and the spread of the 
automobile that home mortgages outnumbered farm mortgages. In the 1930’s, the mortgage 
industry got a huge assist from the feds – not from the tax deduction, but from agencies like 
the Federal Housing Administration, which insured 30-year loans, and, over time, the newly 
created Federal National Mortgage Association, or Fannie Mae. . . . It wasn't until after 1950 
that the majority of homeowners had mortgages.”).  
 40. Peter M. Carrozzo, A New Deal for the American Mortgage: The Home Owners’ 
Loan Corporation, the National Housing Act and the Birth of the National Mortgage 
Market, 17 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2008). 
 41. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. HOUSING FINANCE 
SYSTEM: A HISTORICAL SURVEY AND LESSONS FOR EMERGING MARKETS 3 (2006) (“In this 
era, the maturity terms for most loans were 6 to 10 years, payments were semiannual with no 
or partial amortization of principal, interest rates were variable, and the maximum loan-to-
value ratio was about 50 percent.”); see also KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: 
THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 196 (1985). 
 42. JACKSON, supra note 41, at 196.  
 43. Carrozzo, supra note 40, at 6. 
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was not an option.
44
 The invention of the fixed-rate, self-amortizing, long-
term mortgage came in response to financial turmoil,
45
 as federal legislation 
enacted during the New Deal in the 1930s provided the stability needed in the 
banking industry to offer long-term loans.
46
 This legislation, together with the 
strong expansion of the U.S. economy following World War II, turned 
America from a nation of renters into one of homeowners: homeownership 
levels below 50% prior to 1930 surged in excess of 60% by 1980.
47
 
In the two decades following World War II, mortgage origination in the 
United States was predictable: savings and loan depository institutions made 
the majority of prime mortgage loans.
48
 These depositories directly funded 
the mortgages that they made. In the early 1980s, the landscape of mortgage 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Id. at 7-8 (“Beyond the expense of a new mortgage every five years, the need for 
frequent refinancing was a particular problem in times of tight money when the supply of 
funds was limited. The cost of mortgage money increased as a result. At the outset of the 
Great Depression, the need for mortgage money created by this inefficient system went from 
problematic to catastrophic. . . . [T]he lack of mortgage money for people in desperate need 
to refinance mirrored the cash-flow problem caused by the margin purchasing of stock—a 
fad of the 1920s—and the collapse caused by the call to meet the margin (pay back 
borrowed money used to purchase stock devalued by the crash), when people were least able 
to afford it. With thousands of unemployed homeowners facing foreclosure, hundreds of 
banks failing and a scarcity of available mortgage money, the structurally 
unsound Depression-era mortgage market was crumbling.”). 
 45. See Green & Wachter, supra note 38, at 98-99. 
 46. Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, The Public Option in Housing Finance, 46 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1111, 1115-16, 1130 (2013) (“The New Deal response to the market 
failures in the housing finance market was for the federal government to create new 
institutions that were active as market participants, offering liquidity and insurance to 
financial institutions. This was done through several new institutions that completely remade 
the housing finance market: the Federal Home Loan Banks (“FHLBs”), the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation 
(“FSLIC”), the Home Owners' Loan Corporation (“HOLC”), the Federal Housing Authority 
(“FHA”), the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (“RFC”), the Federal 
National Mortgage Association (or Fannie Mae), and later the Veterans Administration 
(“VA”).”). 
 47. Carrozzo, supra note 40, at 2 (“The New Deal's business-friendly, unobtrusive 
regulation of the American housing market fostered a financial triumph. Indeed, the nation 
of homeowners, unrivaled in the world, and the trillion dollar industry that has grown around 
the American mortgage, can look to a five-year period in the 1930s when a few 
bright New Dealers ushered in a revolution in mortgage lending.”). 
 48. Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to the Subprime “HEL” Was Paved with Good 
Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 
S.C. L. REV. 473, 498 n.155 (2000) (observing that savings and loans made about 60% of 
all home mortgage loans up to 1979) (citing 125 CONG. REC. 29,930 (1979) (statement of 
Sen. Morgan)). 
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origination dramatically shifted and securitization became the primary source 
of mortgage funding.
49
 This remains the norm today.
50
 The majority of 
mortgages are originated by mortgage and finance companies or mortgage 
brokers.
51
 Unlike savings and loans that use deposits to fund mortgage loans, 
mortgage companies typically draw upon a line of credit to extend mortgages 
loans, which the mortgage company will hold for only a short period of 
time—until they can be pooled and sold to investors or securitized.52 
Securitization enables mortgage products to be offered with a broad array of 
choices that appeal to a wide variety of borrowers: higher-risk borrowers can 
participate in the same mortgage pool as lower-risk borrowers.
53
  
The United States government is involved with housing finance both 
directly and indirectly—the former, through the Federal Housing 
Administration and Department of Veterans’ Affairs, and the latter through 
government-sponsored enterprises (e.g. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).
54
 
Homeownership may not be facilitated without a robust housing finance 
system because few potential homebuyers have the savings to buy a home 
outright. Roughly three-quarters of home purchasers in the United States 
utilize financing,
55
 and two-thirds of owner-occupied housing is encumbered 
by secured debt.
56
  
Rates of homeownership in the United States are highly stratified along 
race and class lines. Considering the demographics by race in 2014, 34.4% of 
whites were renters instead of homeowners—in stark contrast to the 66.1% of 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See Green & Wachter, supra note 38, at 99. 
 50. Id. (“The shift to mortgages being funded by capital markets rather than by 
depositories has continued. By the end of 2003, Fannie and Freddie either guaranteed or held 
more than $3.6 trillion of mortgages, or about 60 percent of the market in which they are 
allowed to participate and 43 percent of the overall market.”).  
 51. Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory Lending, 
Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1324 (2006) 
(“Often the initial contact with a borrower is not even made by the loan originator but by 
a mortgage broker. According to the National Association of Mortgage Brokers, 
mortgage brokers may be involved in more than half of all home mortgage loan 
originations.”).  
 52. Id.; see also Green & Wachter, supra note 38, at 99. 
 53. See Green & Wachter, supra note 38, at 99. 
 54. N. ERIC WEISS & KATIE JONES, CONG. RES. SERV., R42995, AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2017). 
 55. RACHEL BOGARDUS DREW, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., 
BUYING FOR THEMSELVES: AN ANALYSIS OF UNMARRIED FEMALE HOME BUYERS tbl.1 
(2006), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/n06-3_drew.pdf. 
 56. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2005. 
at 156 tbl.3-15 (2006). 
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Hispanics and 61% of African Americans.
57
 Broken down by income in the 
same year, 64.8% of low-income households (those with incomes of $31,000 
or less) were renters, 33.5% of upper-middle income households (with 
incomes of $126,000 to $188,000) were renters, and a mere 17.3% of upper-
income households (with incomes of $188,000 or more) were renters.
58
  
II. Past and Present: An Overview of the Home Mortgage 
Interest Deduction  
To the voting public, homeownership is essential to upward mobility and 
integral to the American Dream.
59
 It is has been internalized as a norm, and 
largely perceived as fair, that those who journey through life as renters do not 
receive the same tax benefits as those who choose to borrow and purchase a 
home.
60
 For some, recent changes to the home mortgage interest deduction 
made through the TCJA may upend homeownership as a de facto preference. 
While homeownership carries with it the promise of upside in the form of 
gain on the property, there are also attendant expenses in the form of 
insurance, closing costs, maintenance, remodeling, and property taxes—with 
the new expense of wholly or partially non-deductible mortgage interest 
added to that list for some taxpayers.
61
 Part II provides an overview of the 
home mortgage interest deduction prior to the TCJA, and also explains the 
changes that have been made through this legislation.  
                                                                                                                 
 57. Richard Florida, The New American Dream: A Rental of One’s Own, ATLANTIC 
(Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/02/suburban-
homeowners-to-urban-tenants/463113; see also Richard Fry & Anna Brown, In a 
Recovering Market, Homeownership Rates Are Down Sharply for Blacks, Young Adults, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/12/15/in-a-
recovering-market-homeownership-rates-are-down-sharply-for-blacks-young-adults (noting 
that, in 2004, homeownership reached a pinnacle of 76% for whites and 49.1% for black 
households; in 2007, it reached 49.7% for Hispanic/Latino households; and in 2016, these 
percentages by household were 71.9% white, 41.3% black, and 47% Hispanic/Latino). 
 58. Florida, supra note 57. 
 59. Public Opinion on Opportunity and the American Dream, Homeownership, and 
Housing, OPPORTUNITY AGENDA (2011), https://opportunityagenda.org/explore/resources-
publications/public-opinion-opportunity-and-american-dream-homeownership-and. 
 60. See Lowenstein, supra note 39 (“According to studies, people who own their homes 
take better care of them; they fix the roof more often and plant more lilacs. They join more 
clubs and community groups; they vote more often; they move around less often; and their 
kids do better in school. The government is subsidizing my house so I will do more 
gardening. Or something like that.”). 
 61. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, sec. 11042, § 164(b), 131 
Stat. 2054, 2085-86 (amending I.R.C. § 164(b) to place a cap of $10,000 on the deduction 
for state and local taxes, including property taxes). 
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A. The Home Mortgage Interest Deduction Prior to January 1, 2018  
The norm of homeownership has arguably been woven into the very fabric 
of this country’s culture—dating back to Colonial America when the right to 
vote was often restricted to those who were propertied, with tenants 
inherently having a lesser stake.
62
 However, it is unlikely that a subsidy for 
home mortgage interest was intentionally capitalized into the Internal 
Revenue Code in 1913;
 63
 instead, it is far more likely that one of the 
country’s most expensive tax expenditures arose by accident.64 It was one of 
the many types of personal interest that were deductible until the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 (TRA 1986) amendment denied any deduction for interest on 
personal indebtedness.
65
 Moreover, there is no clear justification for or agreed 
upon explanation for the deduction of personal interest.
66
 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986, together with the Revenue Act of 1987, 
resulted in an overhaul of the Code that dramatically reshaped the 
deductibility of personal interest. Section 163(a) of the Internal Revenue 
Code provided that all interest paid or accrued on indebtedness shall be 
allowed as a deduction.
67
 The home mortgage interest deduction survived as 
a miscellaneous itemized deduction, though one was forced to take a rather 
circuitous route to find it.
68
 An exception to the general rule of I.R.C. § 
163(a) is set forth in § 163(h)(1), which states that in the case of an individual 
taxpayer, no deduction shall be allowed for personal interest.
69
 Exceptions to 
this exception are set forth in I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(2)(D) and (h)(3)—taken 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See generally Donald Ratcliffe, The Right to Vote and the Rise of Democracy, 1787-
1828, 33 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 219 (2013). 
 63. Derek Thompson, America in 1915: Long Hours, Crowded Houses, Death by 
Trolley, ATLANTIC (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/02/ 
america-in-1915/462360/ (“In 1920, there were about four times as many renters as 
homeowners . . . . Houses were cheaper, but buying was a relative hassle: Although the 
average value of a home was no more than $75,000 in today’s dollars, mortgages typically 
required a downpayment of about 50 percent.”). 
 64. See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the 
Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 241-43 (2010). 
 65. Julee Brooke Little, Note, Section 163: Interest Paid on Educational Indebtedness—
Past, Present and Future, 43 TAX LAW. 1007, 1007–08 (1990). 
 66. Ventry, supra note 64, at 236 (“Indeed, the historical record fails to indicate why 
Congress allowed a deduction for personal interest in 1913.”). Scholars have developed 
many theories as to why personal interest was deductible. Id. There is, however, no clear 
right answer.  
 67. I.R.C. § 163(a) (2012). 
 68. See Ventry, supra note 64, at 274. 
 69. I.R.C. § 163(h)(1). 
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together, these provisions allow for the deduction of “qualified residence 
interest,”70 which includes mortgages and home equity loans subject to 
certain limitations.  
The overhaul of the Internal Revenue Code in the late 1980s produced two 
important limitations on home mortgage interest—interest attributable to up 
to $100,000 borrowed against home equity, to be used for any purpose 
whatsoever, remained deductible (“home equity indebtedness”);71 and the 
interest attributable to up to $1 million borrowed to acquire, construct, or 
improve a first or second home
72
 also remained deductible (“acquisition 
indebtedness”).73 
B. The Home Mortgage Interest Deduction Effective January 1, 2018  
President Donald Trump signed the TCJA into law in December 2017 with 
an effective date of January 1, 2018. The home mortgage interest deduction is 
amended in this legislation, though the important impact is collateral—the 
scope of the deduction dramatically changed due to amendment of other 
provisions.  
The direct changes made to the home mortgage interest deduction are 
fairly straightforward. The acquisition indebtedness cap was lowered from $1 
million ($500,000 for married filing separately) to $750,000 ($375,000 for 
married filing separately).
74
 The lowering of the acquisition indebtedness cap 
expires effective January 1, 2026, at which time it reverts to the pre-2018 
level of $1 million. A deduction for interest paid on home equity loans and 
lines of credit is disallowed (through 2026) unless the indebtedness is used to 
“buy, build or substantially improve the taxpayer’s home.”75 While there is 
no longer a $100,000 limit upon home equity indebtedness, importantly, the 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See id. 
 71. In addition to a cap of $100,000 found in I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii), home equity 
indebtedness also may not exceed the fair market value of the residence, reduced by the 
amount of the acquisition indebtedness with respect to such residence. Id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(i). 
 72. Id. § 163(h)(4)(A)(i) (defining “qualified residence” to include an additional home 
used by the taxpayer as a residence).  
 73. Id. § 163(h)(3)(B). 
 74. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, sec. 11042, §164(b), 131 Stat. 
2054, 2086. For acquisition indebtedness incurred before December 15, 2017, there is a 
grandfathering provision and the cap remains at $1 million.  
 75. I.R.S. News Release IR-2018-32 (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/ 
interest-on-home-equity-loans-often-still-deductible-under-new-law.  
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combined amount of acquisition indebtedness and home equity indebtedness 
is capped at $750,000.
76
  
The collateral impact is less obvious: none of these mortgage interest rules 
matter to a taxpayer unless she itemizes. Home mortgage interest is only 
deductible if a taxpayer itemizes his or her deductions on a Schedule A.
77
 A 
taxpayer usually opts to itemize his deductions to the extent that the 
deductions exceed the amount of the standard deduction. For 2018, the 
standard deduction has been raised to $12,000 for a single taxpayer (or 
$24,000 for married filing jointly taxpayers), from 2017 amounts of $6,350 
(single) and $12,700 (married filing jointly). The number of taxpayers 
claiming the home mortgage interest deduction will dramatically drop 
according to estimates from the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), from 
32.3 million in 2017 down to 13.8 million in 2018.
78
 Taxpayers deducted 
$304.5 billion in home mortgage interest in 2015,
79
 and the JCT projects that 
this amount will drop to $25 billion in 2018.
80
  
At the end of 2025, the individual income tax cuts will expire. As a result 
the standard deduction and limitations on the home mortgage interest 
deduction will both revert to pre-TCJA levels.  
III. Cuiusvis hominis est errare, nullius nisi insipientis in errore 
perseverare
81
 
Economists characterize tax preferences—generally in the form of a 
deduction, credit, or exclusion—as an indirect form of government spending 
referred to as a “tax expenditure.”82 The government collected $1.885 trillion 
                                                                                                                 
 76. There is no grandfathering provision for home equity loans or lines of credit, as 
there is with acquisition indebtedness.  
 77. Dep’t of the Treasury, I.R.S. No. 936-10426G 2 (2018). 
 78. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 155TH CONG., TABLES RELATED TO THE 
FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AS IN EFFECT 2017 THROUGH 2026 7 (Comm. Print 2018) [hereinafter 
TABLES RELATED TO THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM: 2017-2026]. 
 79. This is the most current data available from the Internal Revenue Service. See 
Individual Income Tax Returns 2015, I.R.S. Pub. No. 1304, 22 (Rev. 09-2017). 
 80. TABLES RELATED TO THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM: 2017-2026, supra note 80, at 7. 
 81. Translated from the Latin as “Any man is liable to a mistake; but no one but a 
downright fool will persist in error.” Marcus Tullius Cicero, Philippics, Book XII, ii, 5, in 
SELECT ORATIONS OF M.T. CICERO 462 (C.D. Yonge trans., Harper & Bros. 1856).  
 82. This idea was first popularized by Stanley Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury for Tax Policy from 1961 to1969. Surrey oversaw the calculation of the first tax 
expenditure budget for fiscal year 1968. Upon departing from the Treasury, he joined the 
faculty of Harvard Law School. See generally STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX 
REFORM vii (1973). See generally Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The 
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in 2015 from individual income taxes and corporate income taxes,
83
 which 
would be a substantially higher number but for the $1.339 trillion indirectly 
spent through tax expenditures in a “shadow budget.”84 This form of indirect 
spending is insidious
85—more permanent than budgeted spending because it 
does not come up for annual review, and less obvious because most voters do 
not consider this to be “spending.”86 Part III explores the ways in which the 
home mortgage interest deduction is broken from a tax policy perspective 
prior to the TCJA—in that it has always been an upside-down subsidy that 
misallocates benefits to higher-earning taxpayers at the expense of lower and 
middle income taxpayers. Using this as a departure point, Part III then 
explores the fact that the TCJA has caused the mortgage interest deduction to 
become even more regressive. Illustrations demonstrate the old versus new 
impact, in a way that highlights the troubling fairness issues.  
  
                                                                                                                 
Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental 
Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352 (1970); Stanley S. Surrey, Reflections on the Tax Reform 
Act of 1976, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 303 (1976); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device 
for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 
83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970). 
 83. BUREAU OF THE FISCAL SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINAL MONTHLY TREASURY 
STATEMENT 1 (2015). Individual income tax revenue in fiscal year 2015 was $1.541 trillion, 
and corporate income tax was $344 billion, totaling $1.885 trillion. Id. 
 84. Steven Dean, The Tax Expenditure Budget Is a Zombie Accountant, 46 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 265, 267 (2012) (“Enacted into law decades ago, the tax expenditure budget 
computes the dollar cost of a wide range of tax breaks. It serves as a shadow budget for tax 
benefits that would otherwise fall through cracks in the budget process.”); OFFICE OF MGMT. 
AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE 
U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2015, 205-14 tbls.14-1 to -4 (2014).  
 85. In 2015, Medicare spending was $647.9 billion and Medicaid spending was $543.4 
billion, totaling $1.191 trillion. See NHE Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERV., https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-
reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nhe-fact-sheet.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2018). Indirect 
government spending through a “shadow budget” in 2015 thus amounted to more than the 
combined direct spending on Medicare and Medicaid.  
 86. Katy O’Donnell, The Shadow Budget, POLITICO (Oct. 21, 2015, 4:55 AM EDT), 
http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/10/government-tax-code-expenditures-loopholes 
-000290. 
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A. Tax Policy and Homeownership Bias  
Congress uses tax subsidies—such as the deduction for property taxes and 
home mortgage interest—to encourage home ownership.87 While some 
believe that tax expenditures should not be used with the purpose of social 
engineering, it is obvious that the government does indeed use the tax code to 
influence and shape social and economic behavior. In such instances, the tax 
expenditure is arguably justified only when the social purpose (here, the 
promotion of home ownership) is both meritorious and efficiently served. 
Several commentators generally agree that homeownership is beneficial 
for the community:
88
 homeowners are more likely to vote in local elections; 
there is wealth accumulation that benefits homeowners;
89
 those who own 
homes tend to purchase multiple homes over a lifetime, fueling the 
economy;
90
 that, all things being equal, the children of homeowners are more 
likely to succeed (e.g. higher test scores, lower rates of drug usage and anti-
social behaviors);
91
 and, homeowners are more active in their communities.
92
 
                                                                                                                 
 87. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 
at 263-64 (Comm. Print 1987), http://www.jct.gov/jcs-10-87.pdf (“[E]ncouraging home 
ownership is an important policy goal, achieved in part by providing a deduction for 
residential mortgage interest.”); John Iselin & Philip Stallworth, Who Benefits from Tax 
Subsidies for Home Ownership?, URBAN INST. & BROOKINGS INST.: TAX POL’Y CTR. (Sept. 
14, 2016), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/who-benefits-tax-subsidies-home-owner 
ship. 
 88. Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the 
Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1354 (2000). 
 89. It is a proven path to building savings and wealth. See Lawrence Yun, Why 
Homeownership Matters, FORBES (Aug. 12, 2016, 1:09 PM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/lawrenceyun/2016/08/12/why-homeownership-matters/#39b422af480f (“According to 
the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances, a typical homeowner’s net worth was 
$195,400, while that of a renter was $5,400 as of 2013. Given that home prices have risen by 
17% since then, according to Federal Housing Finance Agency[,] the wealth of home 
owning Americans would have grown even more. That is, a typical homeowner will be 
ahead of a typical renter by a multiple of 45 on a lifetime financial achievement scale.”); see 
also Matthew Desmond, How Home Ownership Became the Engine of American Inequality, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/magazine/how-
homeownership-became-the-engine-of-american-inequality.html.  
 90. See Yun, supra note 88 (“With each home sale, there are expenditures related to 
lawn care, home remodeling, new furniture, mortgage origination, moving, and an 
inducement to build new homes.”). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Why Home Ownership Is Good for Everyone, DISCOVER BANK (Jan. 16, 2015), 
https://www.discover.com/home-loans/blog/why-home-ownership-is-good-for-everyone 
(“Homeowners in a city or town are often very invested in the area. They get involved in 
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Homeowners reportedly enjoy better quality housing (e.g. single-family units 
and backyards), and neighborhoods with a higher percentage of single-family 
homes tend to be better maintained and have lower crime rates.
93
 
Given that homeownership generates positive externalities that benefit the 
community,
94
 the relevant question is whether the home mortgage interest 
deduction is effective at promoting that goal. The answer is unequivocally no. 
As one of the largest tax expenditures,
95
 the home mortgage interest 
deduction costs the government around $70 billion annually.
96
 While not all 
tax expenditures disproportionately benefit the wealthy, it is no secret that the 
home mortgage interest deduction is regressive.
97
 Though it is often regarded 
as a middle-class tax benefit, nothing could be further from the truth:
98
 More 
than 77% of the benefits of this deduction flow to households making more 
                                                                                                                 
activities, volunteer for charity organizations and help out with special events. They feel a 
sense of belonging that is often greater than someone who is renting for the short term.”).  
 93. See WILLIAM M. ROHE & MARK LINDBLAD, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF 
HARVARD UNIV. REEXAMINING THE SOCIAL BENEFITS OF HOMEOWNERSHIP AFTER THE 
HOUSING CRISIS 8 (2013), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/hbtl-04.pdf. 
 94. There are, of course, negative externalities to encouraging homeownership that are 
rarely discussed. See Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The Benefits of the Home 
Mortgage Interest Deduction, 17 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 37, 42 (2003) (“The homeowners' 
desire to keep property values up has a dark side, however. Homeowners, not renters, have 
been more aggressive in fighting racial integration, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. More 
recently, homeowners have spearheaded the movement to limit new housing supply, which 
has artificially inflated housing throughout the United States. Essentially, as owners have 
organized, they have started to act like local cartels, restricting new entry into the market: 
the downside to having individuals who have incentives to keep price up.”). 
 95. The home mortgage interest deduction ranks fifth in terms of largest tax 
expenditures for fiscal 2016, behind employer-paid health care, long-term capital gains, 
deferral of active income of controlled foreign corporations, and contributions to defined-
contribution retirement plans. Drew DeSilver, The Biggest U.S. Tax Breaks, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/06/the-biggest-u-s-tax-
breaks. 
 96. Will Fischer & Chye-Ching Huang, Mortgage Interest Deduction Is Ripe for 
Reform, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (June 25, 2013), http://www.cbpp.org/ 
research/mortgage-interest-deduction-is-ripe-for-reform. 
 97. Frank Pompa & Janet Loehrke, Mortgage Deduction Is Popular, but Few Claim It, 
USA TODAY (Dec. 5, 2012, 4:58 AM ET), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/
2012/12/04/fiscal-cliff-mortgage-deduction/1737611 (“The use of the deduction varies 
widely from region to region, ranging from a high of 37% of taxpayers in Maryland to a low 
of 15% in North Dakota and West Virginia . . . .”).  
 98. Louis Jacobson, Do 73 Percent of Benefits from Mortgage Deduction Go to Those 
Earning $250,000 a Year?, POLITIFACT (Dec. 17, 2014, 10:52 AM), http://www.politifact. 
com/truth-o-meter/statements/2014/dec/17/tom-coburn/coburn-says-73-percent-benefits-
mortgage-deduction. 
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than $100,000.
99
 The national rate of homeownership is presently hovering 
around 62%.
100
 Roughly one-third of these homeowners own their homes 
outright and do not have a mortgage.
101
 Of the 173 million homeowners,
102
 
only 40 million (or 22.5%) received any benefit from the home mortgage 
interest deduction prior to the enactment of the TCJA.
103
 It is estimated that 
this number will drop to 13.8 million taxpayers post-TCJA.
104
  
The tables set forth below illustrate the amount of mortgage debt a 
taxpayer would need before the deductible interest in the first year outweighs 
the standard deduction.
105
 These calculations
106
 are based on the first-year 
interest cost for a thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage at the average rate of 
4.32%.
107
  
  
                                                                                                                 
 99. See Rebecca Lake, How Much Income Puts You in the Top 1%, 5%, 10%?, 
INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 15, 2016, 3:58 PM EDT), http://www.investopedia.com/news/how-
much-income-puts-you-top-1-5-10 (“According to statistical data from the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS), the top 1% had an adjusted gross income of $465,626 or higher for the 2014 
tax year. The Washington Center for Equitable Growth put the average household income 
for this group at $1,260,508 for 2014.”).  
 100. Diana Olick, Heads Up Homeowners: Mortgage Interest Deduction on Trump’s 
Chopping Block, CNBC (Dec. 1, 2016, 11:59 AM ET), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/12/01/ 
heads-up-homeowners-mortgage-interest-deduction-on-trumps-chopping-block.html. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. Of the two-thirds of homeowners with mortgages, close to half (primarily lower- 
and middle-income taxpayers) “receive [absolutely] no benefit from the deduction,” some of 
whom because they do not owe federal income taxes at all. Will Fischer & Chye-Ching 
Huang, Mortgage Interest Deduction Is Ripe for Reform, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES (June 25, 2013), http://www.cbpp.org/research/mortgage-interest-deduction-is-
ripe-for-reform. 
 103. Olick, supra note 100.  
 104. Richard Rubin, Tax Changes Mean Mortgage-Interest Deduction Finds Fewer 
Takers, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 2018, 1:30 PM ET), https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2018/
04/23/tax-changes-mean-mortgage-interest-deduction-finds-fewer-takers/. The number of 
taxpayers who itemize is predicted to drop from 46.5 million in 2017 to 18 million in 2018. 
And, only those taxpayers who itemize are eligible to claim the deduction. Id. 
 105. Many taxpayers will itemize even if their deductible interest is less than the standard 
deduction because they are able to add deductions from other sources. For ease of 
illustration, however, these other possible deductions are excluded.  
 106. The author used Bankrate’s Amortization Schedule Calculator. Amortization 
Schedule Calculator, BANKRATE, https://www.bankrate.com/calculators/mortgages/
amortization-calculator.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2018). 
 107. According to Freddie Mac’s report, the thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage averaged 
4.32% for the week ending February 8, 2018. Primary Mortgage Market Survey, FREDDIE 
MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/docs/historicalweeklydata.xls (last visited May 8, 
2018). 
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Table 1. Itemized Mortgage Interest v. Standard Deduction for 2017 
 
FILING 
STATUS 
STANDARD 
DEDUCTION 
MORTGAGE 
BALANCE TO 
ITEMIZE 
AMOUNT OF 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
SINGLE 0$6,350 0$147,000 $6,302.31 
MARRIED 
FILING 
JOINTLY 
00I$12,700 0$296,500 0I$12,711.80 
HEAD OF 
HOUSEHOLD 
0$9,350 0$218,500 $9,367.72 
 
Table 2. Itemized Mortgage Interest v. Standard Deduction for 2018 
 
FILING 
STATUS 
STANDARD 
DEDUCTION 
MORTGAGE 
BALANCE TO 
ITEMIZE 
AMOUNT OF 
INTEREST 
PAYMENT 
SINGLE 0$12,000 0$280,000 $12,004.40 
MARRIED 
FILING 
JOINTLY 
000$24,000 0$560,000 00$24,008.79 
HEAD OF 
HOUSEHOLD 
0$18,000 0$420,000 $18,006.59 
 
Whether to itemize or take the standard deduction is a binary decision—
meaning, taxpayers must choose one path or the other. Only those taxpayers 
who itemize their deductions receive any benefit from the home mortgage 
interest deduction, and as illustrated by Tables 1 and 2 (above), these 
taxpayers are carrying a higher debt load, which generally correlates with 
the higher income needed to service the debt.  
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It is therefore unsurprising that the home mortgage interest deduction has 
always been regressive in its delivery of the homeownership subsidy. 
Before the TCJA, the benefit from the deduction flowed as follows: 84% 
(or $54.63 billion) to households with more than $100,000 in income; and 
45.86% to households with incomes over $200,000.
108
 After TJCA, it is 
projected that the benefit from the deduction will flow as follows: 88% (or 
$28.07 billion) to households with more than $100,000 in income; and 
57.73% to households with over $200,000.
109
 An already regressive 
deduction has been made more regressive by the TCJA. Ironically, the 
benefit of a subsidy intended to facilitate homeownership is flowing to 
those taxpayers less in need of a subsidy—a group already statistically 
more likely to own versus rent. Broken down by income, 33.5% of upper-
middle income households (with incomes of $126,000 to $188,000) are 
homeowners, and 17.3% of upper-income households (with incomes of 
$188,000 or more) are homeowners.
110
  
The home mortgage interest deduction was, and continues to be, a tax 
expenditure that exploits the ignorance and self-interest of the average 
taxpayer to exacerbate systematic problems—a misallocation of benefits to 
upper and upper-middle income taxpayers at the expense of lower and 
middle income taxpayers. In this sense, the dubious moral nature of the 
home interest mortgage deduction is the worst form of exploitation:
111
 
taxpayers are widely supportive of this deduction
112
 either because they are 
misinformed (i.e. they believe that it effectively promotes homeownership), 
self-interested (i.e. they currently receive a subsidy from the deduction), or 
a combination of self-interested and optimistic (i.e. they believe that they 
will one day be homeowners who will be eligible to take the deduction).
113
  
                                                                                                                 
 108. ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES: 2016-2020, supra note 22, at 44.  
 109. ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES: 2017-2021, supra note 23, at 52 tbl.3. 
 110. Florida, supra note 57. 
 111. See generally John Lawrence Hill, Exploitation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 631 (1994).  
 112. Jay Heflin, Mortgage Interest Deduction Has Broad Support Among All Voters, 
HILL (Sept. 23, 2010, 9:35 PM EDT), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/120661-mortgage-
interest-deduction-has-broad-support-among-all-voters?source=patrick.net (“Seventy-nine 
percent of respondents, comprised of homeowners and renters, believe the federal 
government should provide tax incentives to promote homeownership. The consensus cuts 
across party lines with 76 percent of Republicans, 75 percent of Independents and 68 percent 
of Democrats opposing the elimination of the deduction.”).  
 113. Phyllis C. Taite, Taxes, the Problem and Solution: A Model for Vanishing 
Deductions and Exclusions for Residence-Based Tax Preferences, 59 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 
361, 365-66 (2015).  
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This is, however, a tax subsidy that influences the behavior of taxpayers 
with deleterious, interesting, but certainly unintended, consequences: 
taxpayers may buy larger homes,
114
 borrow more money, borrow interest-
only loans (whenever possible),
 115
 and purchase second homes.
116
 
Leveraging is incentivized—and consequently, the housing market is 
flooded with borrowed money, arguably driving up the cost of housing for 
everyone (homeowners and renters both). The revision of the Internal 
Revenue Code through TRA 1986 caused an increase in mortgage 
consumption without a commensurate increase in homeownership rates.
117
 
Mortgage debt became more concentrated among the group of individuals 
who were already participating in the mortgage market, as opposed to being 
spread among more participants.
118
 Some experts contend that a surge in 
credit demand and accessibility contributed to the home mortgage debt 
bubble, and there has consequently been a move to revising policies that 
lower the cost of mortgage debt, such as the home mortgage interest 
deduction.
119
 There is legitimate concern that this tax expenditure 
artificially drives housing prices upward even in times of unsustainable 
appreciation.
120
 But this is ironic—the biggest obstacle to homeownership 
                                                                                                                 
 114. Nick Timiraos, Mortgage Tax Breaks Trickle Up, New Study Shows, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 24, 2014, 1:00 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mortgage-tax-breaks-trickle-up-
new-study-shows-1395612649 (discovering that the average house size in the Washington, 
D.C., area is about 1,400 square feet larger than it would have been if the U.S. government 
didn’t promote home ownership by providing tax benefits such as the mortgage-interest 
deduction). 
 115. ALYSSA KATZ, OUR LOT: HOW REAL ESTATE CAME TO OWN US 216 (2010). 
 116. Iselin & Stallworth, supra note 87. 
 117. David Frederick, Reconciling Intentions with Outcomes: A Critical Examination of 
the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 28 AKRON TAX J. 41, 80 (2013) (“Why would the changes 
to the mortgage interest deduction in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 correspond with an 
increase in mortgage consumption but not an increase in homeownership rates? The simple 
answer is that the refinement of the interest deduction into the mortgage interest deduction 
was enough to cause consumers to switch their mode of personal finance, but even the 
entrenchment of an already existing deduction was insufficient to alter Americans’ personal 
home buying calculations enough to push them into homeownership. A more elegant answer 
would be that though the mortgage market and the housing market are closely related and 
have tremendous overlap, they are not identical.”).  
 118. Id. at 69-70. 
 119. David J. Munroe, Response of Home Equity Debt to Mortgage Policy: Evidence 
from a Kink and a Notch 3 (May 6, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Columbia 
University), http://www.columbia.edu/~djm2166/munroe_hel_052014.pdf. 
 120. Rebecca N. Morrow, Billions of Tax Dollars Spent Inflating the Housing Bubble: 
How and Why the Mortgage Interest Deduction Failed, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 751, 
754-55 (2012). 
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is saving for a down payment,
121
 and capitalization of the home mortgage 
interest deduction into housing prices harms already down-payment-
constrained taxpayers.
122
 Further, evidence suggests that the deduction 
increases the amount borrowed by homeowners while doing nothing to 
increase rates of homeownership.
123
 Certainly, homeownership rates are no 
higher in the United States than in other countries that do not provide 
equivalent tax subsidies.
124
  
The reality of this deduction is lost in propaganda,
125
 and one cannot help 
but cynically pause to consider the political forces that may have had an 
interest in turning the home mortgage interest deduction into a sacred cow 
provision. The answer is likely attributable to some combination of voter 
appeasement, lobbying,
126
 and campaign donations.
127
 For certain private 
                                                                                                                 
 121. See Lane, supra note 36 (“If the Great Recession taught anything, it was that, 
despite decades of rhetoric about the “American Dream” from real estate lobbyists, 
politicians and well-meaning low-income-housing advocates, homeownership is not a 
surefire ticket into the middle class. It can be downright risky. Our national return to Square 
One, homeownership-rate-wise, is thus an opportunity to rethink wealth-building strategies 
for people of modest means. We should de-emphasize house buying and explore alternatives 
that do not require people to bet on a single illiquid asset class — or make it harder to 
relocate in pursuit of opportunities, which is another drawback of home buying.”); see also 
Neal Gabler, The Secret Shame of Middle-Class Americans, ATLANTIC (May 2016), https:// 
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/05/my-secret-shame/476415 (explaining that 
research in 2016 suggests 47% of Americans would have to borrow or sell something to 
cover a $400 emergency, or alternatively, fail to come up with the money entirely).  
 122. Adam J. Cole et al., The Distributional and Revenue Consequences of Reforming the 
Mortgage Interest Deduction, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 977, 987 (2011); see also Desmond, supra 
note 89 (“[T]he benefit helps to prop up home values. It’s impossible to say how much, but a 
widely cited 1996 study estimated that eliminating the MID and property-tax deductions 
would result in a 13 to 17 percent reduction in housing prices nationwide, though that 
estimate varies widely by region and more recent analyses have found smaller effects.”). 
 123. See Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 94, at 39; see also Bruce Bartlett, The Sacrosanct 
Mortgage Interest Deduction, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Aug. 6, 2013, 12:09 AM), https:// 
economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/06/the-sacrosanct-mortgage-interest-deduction/. 
 124. See e.g., Mann, supra note 88 (comparing homeownership rates in ten developed 
countries against the level of tax subsidy conferred upon taxpayers in each country). 
 125. Desmond, supra note 89 (“America’s national housing policy gives affluent 
homeowners large benefits; middle-class homeowners, smaller benefits; and most renters, 
who are disproportionately poor, nothing. It is difficult to think of another social policy that 
more successfully multiplies America’s inequality in such a sweeping fashion.”). 
 126. Lee Drutman, How Corporate Lobbyists Conquered American Democracy, 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/how-
corporate-lobbyists-conquered-american-democracy/390822 (“Something is out of balance 
in Washington. Corporations now spend about $2.6 billion a year on reported lobbying 
expenditures–more than the $2 billion we spend to fund the House ($1.18 billion) and Senate 
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interests in the United States, the mortgage interest deduction has always 
been non-negotiable: “the National Association of Realtors spent $64.8 
million on lobbying efforts in 2016,” which places it “second only to the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce in terms of dollars spent.”128 The National 
Association of Realtors also made $7.3 million in campaign donations in 
the 2012 election cycle, and have made clear that they want current 
mortgage interest deduction policies to remain changed.
129
 The National 
Association of Home Builders has a website that sets forth quotable 
propaganda explaining all of the reasons why “some economists” are flawed 
in their criticisms of the home mortgage interest deduction.
130
 By creating a 
favored type of debt in the Internal Revenue Code, Americans have been 
implicitly encouraged to funnel investment dollars into the industry that 
                                                                                                                 
($860 million). It’s a gap that has been widening since corporate lobbying began to regularly 
exceed the combined House-Senate budget in the early 2000s.”).  
 127. Paul C. Barton, Mortgage Deduction Backers Spend Heavily on Politics, TAX 
ANALYSTS (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.taxhistory.org/www/features.nsf/Articles/ 
7125C98AD87398A785257F6F0055BAA4?OpenDocument (“According to figures 
compiled for Tax Analysts by the Center for Responsive Politics, real estate interests had 
donated more than $36 million to 2016 presidential candidates as of February 5. The total 
reflects money given to their official campaign committees and to outside groups, mainly 
super PACs, that support their candidacies. The leading recipient has been Sen. Ted Cruz, R-
Texas, with $16.04 million. Of that total, $15.34 million reflects money that wealthy Texas 
real estate investors gave to super PACs, which can receive donations of unlimited size. . . . 
To all federal candidates, including those running for congressional seats, the real estate 
sector has so far given $80.42 million in the 2016 elections, according to the Center for 
Responsive Politics.”). 
 128. Desmond, supra note 89 (“We often discuss the influence of the gun and 
pharmaceutical lobbies, but the real estate lobby has spent much more than either group . . . 
[a]nd to 1.2 million Realtors, the mortgage-interest deduction is nonnegotiable. The 
association calls it a ‘remarkably effective tool that facilitates homeownership.’ Jerry 
Howard, the chief executive of the National Association of Home Builders, refers to the 
MID as “one of the cornerstones of American housing policy.”). 
 129. Barton, supra note 127.  
 130. Robert Dietz & Natalia Siniavskaia, Who Benefits from the Housing Tax 
Deductions, NAT’L ASS’N OF HOME BUILDERS (Jan. 4, 2011), http://nationalhousing 
endowment.org/fileUpload_details.aspx?contentTypeID=3&contentID=150471&subContent
ID=314585 (“[These] estimates and [this] data . . . prove the mortgage interest and real 
estate tax deductions are progressive tax rules that provide the majority of their benefits to 
middle class taxpayers. . . . [T]he larger tax benefits for these deductions are realized by 
families and households with larger numbers of members, which is consistent with such 
groups having higher housing demand and costs. Curtailing or eliminating these deductions 
would thus constitute a tax increase on homeowning families, particularly those with 
children, as well as younger households who rely more on mortgage debt as a share of 
household income to achieve homeownership.”) . 
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these lobbyists are hired to support.
131
 Special interests have an incentive to 
retain this powerful deduction without regard to the consequences to 
minorities and lower-income households.  
B. Illustrative Examples 
To support the conclusions presented in this Article, it is useful to 
illustrate the options of four taxpayers with varying income. The model 
taxpayer for the following examples is a young unmarried male borrower 
with no dependents.
132
 He resides in the imaginary state of Amorcensorum 
in the United States,
133
 and the taxpayer spends no more than a 
recommended 35% of pre-tax income on his housing payment.
134
 Where the 
deductions set forth in these examples did not exceed the standard 
deduction for the taxable year, the standard deduction was taken in lieu of 
itemizing deductions. These calculations are based on the first-year interest 
cost for a thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage at the average rate of 4.32%.
135
  
  
                                                                                                                 
 131. Bartlett, supra note 123. 
 132. See Pay Equity & Discrimination, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES., 
https://iwpr.org/issue/employment-education-economic-change/pay-equity-discrimination/ 
(last visited Sept. 8, 2017) (“Women are almost half of the workforce. They are the sole or 
co-breadwinner in half of American families with children. They receive more college and 
graduate degrees than men. Yet, on average, women continue to earn considerably less than 
men. In 2016, female full-time, year-round workers made only 80.5 cents for every dollar 
earned by men, a gender wage gap of 20 percent.”). 
 133. Latin for “love of taxes.” See Amor, LATIN DICTIONARY, https://www.online-latin-
dictionary.com/latin-english-dictionary.php?parola=amor (last visited Sept. 28, 2018) 
(translating “amor” as “to love"); Censeorum, LATIN DICTIONARY, https://www.online-latin-
dictionary.com/latin-english-dictionary.php?lemma=CENSEOR200 (last visited Sept. 28, 
2018) (describing “censeor” as the unconjugated form of “censeorum,” which is translated to 
the ability to “define assets”). 
 134. Affordability of a home is a complicated question that hinges upon the income of 
the taxpayer, as well as the location of the home. Interest rates and property taxes vary from 
state to state, sometimes dramatically. A taxpayer’s housing budget would normally include 
mortgage payment, applicable state/local taxes, and applicable insurance (e.g., homeowner’s 
insurance, PMI insurance). See David Weliver, What Percentage of Your Income Can You 
Afford for Mortgage Payments?, MONEY UNDER 30 (Oct. 4, 2016), 
https://www.moneyunder30.com/percentage-income-mortgage-payments (stating that if one 
is truly conservative, no more than 35% of pretax income should be spent on one’s housing 
budget). 
 135. Mortgage Market Survey, FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/
docs/historicalweeklydata.xls (last visited May 8, 2018) (reporting that the thirty-year fixed-
rate mortgage averaged 4.32% for the week ending February 8, 2018). 
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Case 1: The High-Income Earner 
This taxpayer earns $214,463 per year.
136
 He purchases a $1,200,000 
house in the imaginary state of Amorcensorum, contributing a 20% down 
payment ($240,000) towards the purchase of the house. The remaining 
balance ($960,000) is borrowed subject to a thirty-year (or 360 month) 
term.
137
 The total interest paid over the life of the loan will be $754,336. At 
the end of Year 1, interest paid on the indebtedness will total $41,158.  
For purposes of computing tax liability, the taxpayer is single. His home 
purchase closes on the first day of the tax year. He is twenty-five years old, 
not a widower, has no dependents, and carries health insurance. All of the 
taxpayer’s income is from W-2 employment (with no investment income). 
No state income tax or real estate taxes have been included in these 
computations. The taxpayer is a homeowner who is eligible to take the 
home mortgage interest deduction but no other deductions and no 
applicable tax credits.
138
 Because of this taxpayer’s annual income, the 
Medicare Tax of $130 was included in computations for both 2017 and 
2018.
139
  
  
                                                                                                                 
 136. BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, JESSICA L. SEMEGA & MELISSA A. KOLLAR, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, P60-256(RV), INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015 (2016), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-256.pdf 
(figure from September 2016 report by US Census Bureau reflects data from 2015). 
 137. The author used Bankrate’s Amortization Schedule Calculator. Amortization 
Schedule Calculator, supra note 106. 
 138. Only homes purchased after December 14, 2017 and until 2026 are impacted by the 
changes under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. Any homes purchased prior to December 
14, 2017 are grandfathered under old law. Erica York & Alex Muresianu, The Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act Simplified the Tax Filing Process for Millions of Households, TAX FOUND. (Aug. 
17, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-simplified-the-tax-filing-
process-for-millions-of-households/#_ftnref1. For purposes of calculating the taxpayer’s 
2017 tax liability, 2017 rules are applied. For purposes of calculating the taxpayer’s 2018 tax 
liability, the new rules under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 are applied—which means, 
in effect, that the taxpayer must have purchased his house after December 14, 2017.  
 139. See Questions and Answers for the Additional Medicare Tax, I.R.S., 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/questions-and-answers-for-
the-additional-medicare-tax (last updated July 3, 2018). 
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TAX LIABILITY 
GREATER OF ITEMIZED OR 
STANDARD DEDUCTION 
ESTIMATED TAX LIABILITY IN 2017 $40,503 0000$41,158 
ESTIMATED TAX LIABILITY IN 2018 $40,158 0000$32,154
140
 
 
Case 2: The Middle-Income Earner 
This taxpayer earns $66,739.20 per year.
141
 He purchases a $300,000 
house in Amorcensorum and contributes a 20% down payment ($60,000). 
The remaining balance ($240,000) is borrowed subject to a thirty-year (or 
360 month) term.
142
 The total interest paid over the life of the loan will be 
$188,584. At the end of Year 1, interest paid on the indebtedness will total 
$10,289.  
For purposes of computing tax liability, the taxpayer is single. He is 
twenty-five years old, not a widower, has no dependents, and carries health 
insurance. All of the taxpayer’s income is from W-2 employment (with no 
investment income). No state income tax or real estate taxes have been 
included in these computations. The taxpayer is a homeowner who is 
eligible to take the home mortgage interest deduction, but no other 
deductions and no applicable tax credits.
143
  
 
                                                                                                                 
 140. This illustration presupposes that the taxpayer purchases his home on January 1, 
2018, in which case he will not be grandfathered under the former $1,000,000 limit. Only 
interest attributable to $750,000 of mortgage debt ($32,154.63) will be deductible.  
 141. Median earnings of $1290 per week in 2017 for individuals holding at least a 
bachelor’s degree, at 52.14 weeks per year, equals $67,260.60. See BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USUAL WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE AND SALARY 
WORKERS SECOND QUARTER 2017, at 2 (2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ 
wkyeng.pdf.  
 142. The author used Bankrate’s Amortization Schedule Calculator. Amortization 
Schedule Calculator, supra note 106. 
 143. See supra note 137.  
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TAX LIABILITY 
GREATER OF ITEMIZED OR 
STANDARD DEDUCTION 
ESTIMATED TAX LIABILITY IN 2017 0$8,839 0000$10,289 
ESTIMATED TAX LIABILITY IN 2018 0$7,982 000$12,000 (SD) 
 
Case 3: The Middle-Income Earner: African American Male 
College-educated black men earn roughly 80% the hourly wages of 
white college educated men. Given that the taxpayer in the preceding 
example earns $66,739.20, the assumption for this example will be that the 
African American taxpayer earns $53,391.36.
144
 Because these illustrations 
require that a taxpayer have a monthly housing payment that is equal to or 
less than 35% of his monthly gross income, the taxpayer in Case 3 
purchases a less expensive home than the taxpayer in Case 2—$250,000 
with 20% down ($200,000 mortgage and $50,000 down payment). The total 
interest paid over the life of the loan will be $157,153. At the end of Year 1, 
interest paid on the indebtedness will total $8,574.
145
  
  
                                                                                                                 
 144. See Eileen Patten, Racial Gender Wage Gaps Persist in U.S. Despite Some 
Progress, PEW RES. CTR. (July 1, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/01/ 
racial-gender-wage-gaps-persist-in-u-s-despite-some-progress/. 
 145. The interest attributable to $750,000 of mortgage debt is $32,154.63, which is 
relevant to computing taxes in 2018 when the deduction is limited to interest attributable to 
no more than $750,000 of debt. 
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TAX LIABILITY 
GREATER OF ITEMIZED OR 
STANDARD DEDUCTION 
ESTIMATED TAX LIABILITY IN 2017 0$5,931 00000$8,574 
ESTIMATED TAX LIABILITY IN 2018 0$5,046 000$12,000 (SD) 
 
Case 4: The Low-Income Earner 
This taxpayer earns $33,369.60 per year.
146
 He purchases a $150,000 
house in Amorcensorum
147
 and contributes a 20% down payment 
($30,000). The remaining balance ($120,000) is borrowed subject to a 
thirty-year (or 360 month) term.
148
 The total interest paid over the life of the 
loan will be $94,292. At the end of Year 1, interest paid on the indebtedness 
will total $5,144.
149
  
 
  
                                                                                                                 
 146. Median earnings of $1290 per week in 2017 for those holding at least a bachelor’s 
degree, at 52.14 weeks per year, equals $67,260.60. News Release, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Usual Weekly Earnings of Wage and Salary Workers Second 
Quarter 2017 (July 19, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/wkyeng.pdf. For 
purposes of this example, we are assuming that the taxpayer earns a wage that is one-half of 
the median wage. 
 147. Just as we used one-half of the salary stipulated in example one, in this example, we 
will use one-half of the home value. As of September 2017, the median home value in San 
Bernardino, California is $256,400 according to Zillow. San Bernadino Home Prices & 
Values, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/san-bernardino-ca/home-values/ (last visited Sept. 
8, 2017). 
 148. See Mortgage Calculator, NERDWALLET, https://www.nerdwallet.com/mortgages/ 
mortgage-calculator/calculate-mortgage-payment (last visited Sept. 8, 2017). 
 149. The interest attributable to $750,000 of mortgage debt is $32,154.63, which is 
relevant to computing taxes in 2018 when the deduction is limited to interest attributable to 
no more than $750,000 of debt. 
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TAX LIABILITY 
GREATER OF ITEMIZED OR 
STANDARD DEDUCTION 
ESTIMATED TAX LIABILITY IN 2017 0$2,979 0000$6,350 (SD) 
ESTIMATED TAX LIABILITY IN 2018 0$2,374 000$12,000 (SD) 
 
In each of the above illustrations, the taxpayer is receiving a tax cut 
without regard to the partial or complete loss of the home mortgage interest 
deduction.
150
 Because the home mortgage interest deduction is only 
available to those taxpayers who itemize their deductions, the home 
mortgage interest deduction inures only to the benefit of the Case 1, High-
Income Earner after passage of the TCJA.  
IV. Temporary-Effect Tax Legislation and Retrenchment of Entrenchment  
 The fundamental difference between temporary-effect and permanent 
legislation is that the former must be extended to continue, whereas the 
latter must be repealed to cease. Temporary-effect legislation is an all-
encompassing term referring to legislation that contains an expiration date 
or “sunset” provision,151 and includes legislation that is temporary in 
duration and/or temporary in effect.
152
 Though temporary-effect legislation 
has more recently come into vogue in the context of sweeping tax 
legislation,
153
 use of such legislation has been used before, during, and after 
                                                                                                                 
 150. The tax cuts are as follows: Case 1, 0.85%; Case 2, 9.7%; Case 3, 14.93%; and Case 
4, 20.31%. 
 151. See Kysar, The Sun Also Rises supra note 29, at 337-38 n.7 (quoting AM. 
ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RES., ZERO-BASED BUDGETING AND SUNSET LEGISLATION 
5 (1967) (“Typically, sunset legislation sets a date on which either budget authority or a 
program expires automatically unless reauthorized.”)). 
 152. See supra notes 24, 25 (explaining the terms temporary legislation and/or 
temporary-effect legislation).  
 153. This Article excludes “tax extenders” from its discussion of temporary-effect tax 
legislation. It is worth mentioning, however, that tax extenders embody every negative 
criticism of temporary-effect tax legislation, with little upside. They are a subset of 
temporary-effect legislation that are far narrower in scope, usually addressing one specific 
issue. Dozens of tax provisions—some codified decades ago, while others have been enacted 
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the founding of the United States.
154
 Though there are four underlying 
reasons why legislation may be enacted as temporary (as a responsive 
policy tool, to circumvent budgetary and procedural restrictions, in 
response to transitory circumstances, and in response to strategic concerns), 
it is not reductionist to state simply that most temporary-effect legislation is 
the product of some amalgam of politics and policy.
155
 Part IV considers the 
advantages and disadvantages of temporary-effect legislation, while also 
exploring the way in which such legislation may have been used to 
facilitate reform of entrenched, deleterious tax policy.  
A. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Temporary-Effect Legislation  
Historically, a sunset provision in temporary-effect legislation was 
tailored to a discrete provision that would then expire by its own terms 
unless reauthorized.
156
 While the use of these provisions in tax legislation is 
                                                                                                                 
more recently—are scheduled to expire each year. When the process operates smoothly, 
Congress rushes to renew extenders in December, generally without much scrutiny. Business 
as usual with tax extenders is the decades-long practice of tacking the extenders onto a 
different piece of legislation and passing them without much consideration. Consequently, 
extenders are technically temporary but effectively permanent because budgeting rules do 
not require that Congress estimate a cost beyond the one or two-year term of the extender. 
For more information about extenders, see DANIEL BERMAN & VICTORIA HANEMAN, MAKING 
TAX LAW 126 (2014) (“Expiring provisions mask the long-term cost of tax proposals that 
reduce revenue, and may therefore . . . lack political support to be enacted permanently. It is, 
for example, far easier to pass a provision that costs $10 million for one year rather than 
$100 million for ten years.”). 
 154. See Gersen, supra note 30, at 250-54 (“Indeed, going far beyond acceptance 
of temporary statutes, at one point Thomas Jefferson crafted a normative argument in favor 
of a temporary or intragenerational constitution. In an exchange of letters between Jefferson 
and James Madison, the two confronted the desirability of an entire constitution that would 
sunset at the turn of each generation. Jefferson argued that no generation had the normative 
authority to bind another generation to its constitution or laws: On similar ground it may be 
proved that no society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth 
belongs always to the living generation Every constitution, then, and every law, naturally 
expires at the end of 19 years.”).  
 155. See Oh, supra note 30.  
 156. See Kysar, The Sun Also Rises, supra note 29, at 338 (“Over the past three decades, 
Congress has employed sunset provisions to discrete sections of tax legislation. Rather 
significantly, however, Congress recently attached far-reaching sunset provisions to nearly 
the entirety of major tax acts.”); Chris Mooney, A Short History of Sunsets, LEGAL AFF. 
(Jan./Feb. 2004), http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2004/story_mooney_ 
janfeb04.msp (“Sunsetting was once heralded as a cure-all to the ills of inefficient 
government, a legislative device capable of eliminating obsolete and antiquated statutes and 
of keeping stodgy regulatory bureaucracies efficient and effective. But what was once a 
weapon for good-government reformers has been transformed in recent years. Under the 
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neither novel nor new,
157
 the modern age of temporary-effect legislation 
was marked by the prolific use of these provisions in the Economic Growth 
and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001(EGTRA)—with every tax provision in 
the Act expiring on December 31, 2010.
158
 Two years later, nearly every 
provision in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) 
sunsets before 2008.
159
 Though temporary-effect legislation was once a tool 
to address new needs or problems in a restrained way, expansive sunset 
provisions are now being incorporated in response to budget rules intended 
to constrain government spending.
160
 In fact, the budget math mandated by 
the now-infamous Byrd rule may be credited for the sunset provisions in the 
2001 and 2003 tax cuts (EGTRA and JGTRRA), as well as the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act of 2017.
161
 
In a polarized political climate, the most likely route for legislating tax 
reform will be through the budget reconciliation process.
162
 This is largely 
owing to changes implemented in the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 
which allows the Senate to pass deficit reduction legislation—referred to as 
budget reconciliation—by a simple-majority “vote of fifty-one rather than 
                                                                                                                 
Bush Administration, sunsetting has been reduced to a spoonful of sugar that helps 
controversial legislation go down.”). 
 157. See Mooney, supra note 156 (“[The history of sunsetting] stretches back to the 
writings of Thomas Jefferson. Though he didn't use the word, Jefferson believed that a 
version of sunsetting sprang directly from natural law. ‘Every constitution . . . and every 
law,’ he wrote, ‘naturally expires at the end of 19 years,’ which was considered the length of 
a generation in his era.”). 
 158. See Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 
Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Viswanathan, supra note 
30, at 657 (“The majority of the tax cuts enacted in 2001, 2002, and 2003 will expire before 
2011.”). 
 159. See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 
117 Stat. 752 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 160. See Kysar, The Sun Also Rises, supra note 29, at 338. 
 161. See Ellen P. Aprill & Daniel J. Hemel, The Tax Legislative Process: A Byrd’s Eye 
View, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2018, at 99. 
 162. The 1986 Tax Reform Bill passed in the Republican-controlled Senate by a vote of 
74-23 because majority-party members courted the minority-party members needed for 
cloture. See Brad Dillon, Budget Reconciliation: Procedure and Possibilities for Permanent 
Tax Reform, 126 J. TAX’N 170, 171 (2017). This courtship approach is unlikely to be 
effective in a highly polarized political setting. Another possible path involves the majority-
party members of the Senate eliminating the super-majority requirement for cloture. Dubbed 
“the nuclear approach,” it always remains a possibility, but no serious attempt to implement 
it has been undertaken. For an overview on these three obvious paths for legislating tax 
reform, see id. 
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the super-majority (filibuster-avoiding) vote of sixty.”163 The Byrd Rule, a 
procedural centerpiece of the reconciliation process, allows a provision to 
be removed from reconciliation legislation if is extraneous.
164
 Though there 
are several ways in which legislation may run afoul of requirements and be 
deemed extraneous, perhaps the most relevant for purposes of temporary-
effect tax legislation is that the provision may not increase the deficit in any 
year beyond the ten-year budget window.
165
 The TCJA demonstrates the 
way in which this seemingly minor, once-obscure procedural rule has 
become extremely impactful in shaping tax legislation over the past two 
decades:
166
 almost all of the individual tax provisions in the bill expire 
December 31, 2025.
167
 
This “new normal” of temporary-effect tax legislation raises four 
criticisms regarding temporariness as a legislative strategy: it evokes 
change that will lead to deficit increases; the uncertainty of temporary 
changes undermines long-term investment strategies; legislative transaction 
costs increase; and, it is a legislative entrenchment strategy that allows the 
legislature of today to impose its agenda on the legislature of tomorrow.
168
 
Critics assert that the practice of sunsetting tax legislation, or terminating its 
effect prior to the end of the ten-year budget window, hides or disguises 
true budgetary cost.
 169
 Further, temporary legislation may create 
uncertainty when taxpayers will not internalize the tax change into long-
                                                                                                                 
 163. BERMAN & HANEMAN, supra note 153, at 119. 
 164. A provision is extraneous if it: (A) “does not produce a change in outlays or 
revenues;” (B) “produc[es] an increase in outlays or decrease in revenues” that does not 
follow the reconciliation instructions in the budget resolution; (C) “is not in the jurisdiction 
of the committee” that reported the provision; (D) “produces changes in outlays or revenues 
which are merely incidental to the non-budgetary components of the provision[s];” (E) 
increases the deficit in any fiscal year after the period specified in the budget resolution (i.e., 
the “budget window”); or, (F) recommends changes to Social Security. 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1) 
(2012). 
 165. See BERMAN & HANEMAN, supra note 153, at 120.  
 166. See Aprill & Hemel, supra note 161, at 99-102. Temporary-effect legislation has 
since become a popular strategy employed by politicians to entrench a political agenda. See, 
e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, US Experience with Federal Budget Rules, CESIFO DICE REP., Jan. 
2009, at 41 (concluding that budget rules did have some effects); James M. Poterba, Do 
Budget Rules Work?, in FISCAL POLICY: LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC RESEARCH 53 (Alan J. 
Auerbach ed., 1997) (surveying empirical literature on budget institutions and fiscal policy). 
 167. See Aprill & Hemel, supra note 161, at 100. 
 168. See Yin, supra note 30, at 232-33; see also, e.g., Kysar, The Sun Also Rises, supra 
note 29, at 338-41 (concluding that sunset provisions are “mere devices that assist 
congressional misbehavior”).  
 169. See Yin, supra note 168, at 189-94.  
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term planning because of the possibility of change,
170
 which will ultimately 
undermine the effectiveness of the provision.
171
 Although uncertainty 
surrounds all lawmaking, both permanent and temporary, the latter is 
inherently more unreliable in that it requires an affirmative response to 
continue—especially when the renewal of a provision requires political 
momentum to be successful. The third common criticism argues that 
legislative transaction costs increase, with an eye towards private-sector 
lobbying costs required to influence expiring or uncertain outcomes.
172
 
Finally, critics are concerned with the strategy of stringing along and 
forcing reconsideration of tax provisions. The nature of temporary-effect 
tax legislation is that, rather than definitively resolving an issue, the matter 
is kicked down the road eight to ten years to be reconsidered later—
monopolizing the agenda of tomorrow with issues that need to be revisited. 
And as was seen recently in the estate planning community, the failure to 
revisit and address these expiring provisions may cause a train wreck.
173
 
Supporters of temporary-effect tax legislation argue that the provisions 
increase accountability and allow for more accurate budget forecasting than 
permanent legislation.
174
 It has been heralded by some as potentially 
transformative
175 and a solution to stagnancy.176 Others point to the need for 
temporary-effect legislation as symbolic of a deeper problem: the only way 
                                                                                                                 
 170. See Zachary J. Gubler, Making Experimental Rules Work, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 
577 (2015) (“Depending on the type of tax cut, taxpayers might accelerate the sale of capital 
assets to benefit from temporary capital gains taxes, or they might accelerate inter vivos gifts 
to take advantage of a temporary increase in the estate tax exemption. Regardless, the 
resulting data in that case would be skewed as a result of the over-responsiveness of the 
rule's beneficiaries.”). 
 171. See Tax Code Complexity: New Hope for Fresh Solutions: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. On Finance, 107th Cong. 21-23 (2001) (statement of Betty Wilson, President, Tax 
Executives Institute) (arguing that the temporary nature of certain tax provisions creates a 
fruitless complexity which undermines public faith in the tax system). 
 172. See Yin, supra note 30, at 239. 
 173. See Beth Shapiro Kaufman, 2010: The Anatomy of a Train Wreck, EST. PLAN., May 
2010, at 42, 43 (“[T]he uncertainty of 2010 is paralyzing.”).  
 174. See William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, An Economic Assessment of Tax Policy in 
the Bush Administration, 2001-2004, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1157, 1178 (2004) (illustrating how 
permanent tax cuts, unlike the expiring tax provisions imposed by the Bush administration, 
threaten fiscal stability); see also Yin, supra note 30, at 237-39.  
 175. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 30 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1 JANUARY 1798-31 JANUARY 1799, at 250-51 (Barbara B. 
Oberg ed., 2003) (discussing the merits of a constantly temporary Constitution). 
 176. See THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE 
UNITED STATES 42 (Norton 2d ed., 1979) (1969). 
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in which to navigate around the counter-majoritarian Senate requirement of 
sixty votes to invoke cloture and avoid filibuster. Thus, in a polarized 
political environment, temporary-effect tax legislation passed during the 
reconciliation process by a simple majority may be the only way in which 
to change entrenched tax provisions.
177
 Temporary tax legislation may be 
used to demonstrate the effectiveness of a tax provision, to temporarily 
advantage a new or socially desirable industry, or to provide temporary 
assistance in times of crisis.
178
  
B. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Acts of 2017: Temporary-Effect Legislation in 
Action 
The enactment of the TCJA makes for an interesting study of temporary-
effect tax legislation because of its approach to revision of the home 
mortgage interest deduction. As discussed above in Part III, promotion of 
home ownership is an idea that receives broad support from both political 
parties. Although “America’s favorite tax break”179 has critics across the 
political spectrum, it remains a fixture in the Internal Revenue Code
180—
perhaps because politicians are loath to touch the proverbial “third rail” with 
attempted reform or repeal of a “sacred cow” provision.181  
The TCJA has revised interlocking tax provisions—specifically, the 
reduced individual income tax rates, increased standard deduction, and new 
limitations upon the home mortgage interest deduction—thereby moving 
pieces on a chess board to eliminate a valued entitlement and shift 
                                                                                                                 
 177. See Yin, supra note 30, at 248-49. 
 178. See Kysar, The Sun Also Rises, supra note 29, at 358-59. 
 179. Nicholaus W. Norvell, Transition Relief for Tax Reform’s Third Rail: Reforming the 
Home Mortgage Interest Deduction After the Housing Market Crash, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1333, 1334-35 (2012) (quoting Jeanne Sahadi, Mortgage Deduction America’s Costliest Tax 
Break, CNN MONEY (Apr. 15, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/14/pf/taxes/mortgage_ 
interest_deduction/index.htm) (“Tax policy experts on both the left and right agree that the 
mortgage interest deduction fails to meaningfully increase the homeownership rate despite 
the substantial subsidy for many homeowners.”).  
 180. See Lowenstein, supra note 39 (“Over the years, [the mortgage interest deduction] 
has become an American folk legend: the government invented the mortgage-interest 
deduction to help people buy their own homes, and the level of homeownership has risen 
ever since. What part of the legend is true? Basically, none of it.”). 
 181. This Author believes that discussion of the home mortgage interest deduction 
warrants the bold move of mixing metaphors in the same sentence. See Sacred Cow, supra 
note 1; Third Rail of Politics, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_rail_of_ 
politics (last visited May 9, 2018) (“The third rail of a nation’s politics is a metaphor for any 
issue so controversial that it is ‘charged’ and ‘untouchable’ to the extent that any politician 
or public official who dares to broach the subject will invariably suffer politically.”). 
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prevailing norms, while also lowering tax rates across the board to focus 
attention away from the lost entitlement. As demonstrated in the 
illustrations included in Section III.B., all four taxpayers (ranging from the 
high-income earner at $214,463, down to the low-income earner at 
$33,369.60) see a tax cut, without regard to whether or not the taxpayer has 
lost the ability to deduct home mortgage interest. This type of “baited” tax 
reform is a shell game of sorts, in which the attention of the taxpayer is 
focused upon the impact of a lost or reduced deduction because the impact 
is not felt. The home mortgage interest has become increasingly regressive, 
with a predicted 24% of the subsidy from the revised deduction flowing “to 
households earning more than $500,000” per year.182  
Use of temporary-effect tax legislation to change the home mortgage 
interest deduction is arguably a progressive step in an unintentionally 
regressive plan. A window of opportunity has been created, extending from 
January 1, 2018 through December 31, 2025, which will allow politicians 
the opportunity to wholly rid the Code of this tax expenditure.
183
 The 
temporary character of the legislation affords time—between enactment and 
sunset—for preferences to shift and the acceptability of the policy 
underlying the legislation to change.
184
 It is possible that simply by being 
enacted,
185
 even in the form of temporary-effect legislation, reform of the 
home mortgage interest deduction starts to become more acceptable.
186
 If 
we accept the notion that extreme policies are less stable and more likely to 
change, the degree to which the public currently embraces the home 
mortgage interest deduction would render a wholesale repeal unstable
187—
                                                                                                                 
 182. This is up from 12.4% on 2017 returns. Jordan Weissmann, Republicans Gutted the 
Mortgage Interest Deduction. Democrats Should Finish It Off, SLATE (Apr. 27, 2018, 2:23 
PM), https://slate.com/business/2018/04/its-time-for-the-mortgage-interest-deduction-to-go. 
html. 
 183. See Amir El-Sibaie, A Look Ahead at Expiring Tax Provisions, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 
18, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/look-ahead-expiring-tax-provisions/. 
 184. For interesting discussion of these issues, see Oh, supra note 30, at 1056-58 
(discussing factors influencing renewal of temporary legislation). 
 185. See Mooney, supra note 156 (“No sooner had the laws been passed than their 
Republican backers launched a pre-emptive strike, criticizing the sunsets and attempting to 
undo them.”). 
 186. See Jason S. Oh, Will Tax Reform Be Stable?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1176-77 
(2017) (discussing how a rule that prevents new legislation from adding to the federal deficit 
may make tax deductions more stable). 
 187. See id. at 1202-03 (“However, there is evidence suggesting that limiting the home 
mortgage interest deduction would be much stickier than repealing it entirely. . . . [t]he 
majority of legislators from across the political spectrum have expressed support for limiting 
the mortgage interest deduction in various ways. Options include restricting the mortgage 
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whether temporary or permanent.
188
 Instead, a partial and baited gutting of 
the provision allows a new status quo to take shape as taxpayers forego the 
deduction in lieu of the standard deduction—partial in that some 
homeowners retain the deduction; and baited in that everyone receives a tax 
cut to distract from the loss of a prized deduction. In the context of the 
home mortgage interest deduction, temporariness of change in the short-
term may lead to durability of result in the long-term—provided that an 
effective and targeted change occurs before January 1, 2026. An irony 
inheres when a strategy of temporariness may cultivate permanence in 
policy.  
The use of temporary-effect legislation to retrench an entrenched tax 
provision may be simultaneously protective and paternalistic. Moreover, it 
is notable—an approach that avoids many of the costs that may be 
otherwise born from advancing a politically unpopular goal. When the self-
interested thinking of the voting majority drives entrenchment, temporary-
effect legislation may be utilized to gradually shift the attitudes of the 
masses to facilitate retrenchment.  
V. A Time to Pivot: Towards Solutions  
Accepting that every tax expenditure is, on some level, an act of social 
engineering that capitalizes cultural expectations and identity, this Article 
contends that the regressive changes to this homeownership subsidy have 
paved the way for meaningful reform. Successfully advancing change 
through the political process is often wholly dependent upon timing. The 
regressive nature of the home mortgage interest deduction has been 
exacerbated through the TCJA, but the 2025 expiration date of the 
individual tax provisions opens a window of opportunity to eliminate the 
deduction from the Code, while only stripping a small minority of that 
entitlement. Part V first considers the politics and processes of tax policy at 
operation and the way in which temporary-effect legislation may be useful 
strategy to retrench entrenchment of bad tax policy. A substantive solution 
is thus advanced: the repeal of the home mortgage interest deduction in its 
                                                                                                                 
interest deduction to a single house, reducing the mortgage cap from $1.1 million, or 
replacing the mortgage interest deduction with a tax credit. . . . In fact, our search yielded 
statements from over forty legislators from all over the ideological spectrum that wanted to 
limit the mortgage interest deduction in some way. This suggests that relative to repeal, 
limiting the mortgage interest deduction enjoys substantial legislative support and is likely a 
more stable policy.”). 
 188. See id. at 1178-80 (discussing how legislators’ preferences change over time). 
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entirety on or before its expiration date, to be replaced with a fixed credit 
for homeownership that is tied to neither mortgages or debt.  
A. The Impact of Politics and Processes in Shaping Tax Policy 
Numerous and varied proposals for reform have been floated over the 
past three decades by congressional policymakers.
189
 Limiting the home 
mortgage interest deduction for higher-income earners, or replacing the 
deduction altogether with a tax credit, is not a novel idea. Every year since 
2010, the Obama Administration included a proposal in the Greenbooks 
sent to Congress that curtailed the home mortgage interest deduction for 
high-earners.
190
 This proposal limited the mortgage interest deduction for 
33%, 35%, and 39.6% taxpayers—specifically, single taxpayers earning 
more than $191,650 and married taxpayers earning more than $233,350.
191
 
Whereas a deduction for a taxpayer in the 39.6% bracket would normally 
be valued at the amount of the deduction multiplied by the tax rate (here, 
39.6%), the value of the deduction would instead be limited to the dollar 
amount of eligible home mortgage interest multiplied by 28%.
192
 In rough 
terms, the value of a $100 home mortgage interest deduction for a 39.6% 
taxpayer would be $28 ($100 multiplied by 28%) rather than $39.60 ($100 
                                                                                                                 
 189. See generally Norvell, supra note 179.  
 190. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS 87-88 (2009); U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2011 
REVENUE PROPOSALS 132 (2010); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF 
THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2012 REVENUE PROPOSALS 132 (2011); U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2013 
REVENUE PROPOSALS 74 (2012); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF 
THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2014 REVENUE PROPOSALS 135 (2013); U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2015 
REVENUE PROPOSALS 154-55 (2014); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL 
EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS 155 
(2015); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S 
FISCAL YEAR 2017 REVENUE PROPOSALS 154 (2016). See generally BERMAN & HANEMAN, 
supra note 153. 
 191. I.R.C. § 1; 2017 Federal Tax Rates, Personal Exemptions, and Standard Deductions: 
IRS Tax Brackets & Deduction Amounts for Tax Year 2017, U.S. TAX CENTER, 
https://www.irs.com/articles/2017-federal-tax-rates-personal-exemptions-and-standard-
deductions (last visited Oct. 29, 2018). 
 192. WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 23 (5th ed. 1999) (“[A] 
deduction only reduces taxes by the amount of the allowable deduction multiplied by 
the taxpayer's marginal tax rate.”). 
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multiplied by $39.60).
193
 The Simpson-Bowles commission, appointed by 
President Obama to suggest reforms to the tax code that would reduce the 
deficit,
194
 proposed that the home mortgage interest cap be reduced from its 
current $1 million limit down to $500,000, and that the tax break for second 
homes be eliminated.
195
 In the 2016 election, Republican Presidential 
candidates Camp and Cruz also supported this proposed reduction down to 
$500,000,
196
 while Democratic candidates Clinton and Sanders supported a 
version of the Obama plan.
197
  
For more than three decades, the National Commission on Fiscal 
Responsibility and Reform has proposed replacing the mortgage interest 
deduction with a 12% non-refundable tax credit for interest paid on the first 
$500,000 of mortgage debt.
198
 The Bipartisan Policy Center’s Debt 
Reduction Tax Force Plan presented a different version of the non-
refundable credit proposal in 2010: a 15% refundable credit for the first 
$25,000 of home mortgage interest.
199
 This credit would not apply to home 
mortgage interest attributable to a second home or a home equity loan.
200
 
The idea of a tax credit replacing the home mortgage interest deduction has 
been embraced, in some variously stated form, by those on the right such as 
the American Enterprise Institute economist Alan Viard, as well as those on 
the left, including the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
201
  
Despite decades of discussion, and the proposal of more effective 
alternatives, congressional policymakers have avoided substantially 
                                                                                                                 
 193. The Obama Administration, in effect, was capping benefits that flow upwards as a 
result of the “upside-down” effect of deductions. See Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and 
Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 24 (2006). 
 194. Exec. Order No. 13,531, 75 Fed. Reg. 7927 (Feb. 18, 2010).  
 195. NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESP. & REFORM, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH 27 fig.7 
(Comm. Print 2010). 
 196. Barton, supra note 127. 
 197. See Richard Auxier et al., An Analysis of Hillary Clinton’s Tax Proposals, TAX 
POL’Y CTR. (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/analysis-hillary-
clintons-tax-proposals; see also Making the Wealthy, Wall Street, and Large Corporations 
Pay Their Fair Share, BERNIE 2016, https://berniesanders.com/issues/making-the-wealthy-
pay-fair-share (last visited Oct. 19, 2017).  
 198. Adam J. Cole, Geoffrey Gee & Nicholas Turner, The Distributional and Revenue 
Consequences of Reforming the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 977, 978 
(2011). 
 199. Id. 
 200. BRUCE KATZ, BROOKINGS INST., REFORM THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION TO 
INVEST IN INNOVATION AND ADVANCED INDUSTRIES 3 (2012), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06-mortgage-interest-deduction.pdf. 
 201. Bartlett, supra note 123. 
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changing America’s favorite, entrenched tax break. Amended through the 
TCJA, all attention on the home mortgage interest deduction should now be 
upon the expiration date of the amendment so that an important opportunity 
is not lost.
202
 Although a criticism of temporary-effect legislation is the 
agenda-control that a past legislature imposes on a future legislature, 
implicit in temporariness is an intertemporal choice that risks legislative 
drift.
203
 Specifically, while a future committee chair will be forced to 
reconsider the temporary-effect legislation, he or she is also in a position to 
have significant substantive impact.
204
 Legislators will be forced to 
reconsider the matter of the home mortgage interest deduction, but 
temporariness allows for information gathering with regard to the 
regressive distributional impact—supported not by estimates and 
projections, but actual hard data—and for the first time in decades, timing 
will be ideal for wholesale deconstruction and reconstruction of 
homeownership subsidies.  
The January 1, 2018 change to the home mortgage interest deduction 
draws attention, once again, to the disagreement between scholars as to 
whether temporary-effect legislation is beneficial or harmful. When utilized 
as a functional entrenchment device, such legislation is problematic; 
conversely, when utilized as a reform or retrenchment device to dislodge an 
embedded entitlement, temporary-effect legislation may serve an invaluable 
purpose. The home mortgage interest deduction is the product of either 
functional or unintentional entrenchment.
205
 The impediment to change 
with regard to this tax expenditure seems to be political not legal: the 
inevitable public outrage over the loss of a beloved tax expenditure.
206
 
Though a well-functioning democracy is responsive to majority will, the 
home mortgage interest deduction has been functionally entrenched for 
decades because a majority of Americans embrace the expenditure out of 
                                                                                                                 
 202. See generally Norvell, supra note 179.  
 203. Gersen, supra note 30, at 281–82. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 
YALE L.J. 400, 475-76 (2015) (“As it happens, the phenomenon of entrenchment as it has 
been understood by social scientists and historians (and even the occasional legal scholar) is 
in no way limited to the self-consciously strategic efforts of political actors. . . . [C]onsider 
the home mortgage interest deduction, which created—apparently quite by accident—a 
constituency of homeowners and mortgage lenders that is deeply committed to, and 
formidably capable of, preserving their entitlement.”).  
 206. See id. (explaining that criminal laws against homicide are not entrenched, because 
they would endure “because they remain consistent with the first-order political preferences 
of a (super) majority citizen”). 
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ignorance (as to the real benefits and burdens of the tax expenditure), self-
interest (because they themselves receive a benefit from the deduction), or 
optimism (in that they believe that they will one day receive a benefit, 
though they do not now)—but for no reason related to social good.  
There are innumerable examples of temporary-effect tax legislation that 
facilitates Congressional misbehavior or circumvents budget constraints. 
Perhaps the most notable is the federal estate and gift tax—which has 
effectively been in a state of flux for almost twenty years, with Republicans 
pushing for permanent repeal but not having the requisite number of votes 
to accomplish it. Exemption amounts have increased, rates have fallen, the 
estate tax briefly died, and was later resurrected,
207
 with Republicans 
refusing to accept that they should stop trying to make fetch happen.
208
 In 
fact, changes to the estate and gift tax over the past two decades are an 
example of temporary-effect legislation being used as a tool of functional 
                                                                                                                 
 207. With Republican control of the House, Senate and Presidency in 2001, and a budget 
surplus, President Bush was unable to secure a permanent repeal of the estate and gift tax. 
The Byrd Rule overrode the reconciliation process because the legislation increased the 
federal deficit beyond the ten-year window. Consequently, repeal of the estate and gift tax 
would have required a 60-vote majority in the Senate. MAYLING BIRNEY & IAN SHAPIRO, 
DEATH AND TAXES: THE ESTATE TAX REPEAL AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 5 (2004), 
https://gradebuddy.com/doc/2623630/death-and-taxes-the-estate-tax-repeal-and-american-
democracy?full=1. Unable to rally these 60 votes, Republicans had to settle for temporary-
effect legislation. The Economic Growth and Reconciliation Act of 2001 increased the estate 
tax exemption from 2001 through 2009 and repealed the estate tax for 2010 (though the 
repeal never came to pass). Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38. Estate taxes in 2010 through 2012 were based upon the Tax 
Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization and Job Creation Act, signed into law on 
December 17, 2010, which was supposed to sunset on December 31, 2012. Tax Relief, 
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-312, 
124 Stat. 3296. The American Taxpayer Relief Act was signed into law on January 2, 2013, 
which was intended to make permanent the laws on the estate and gift tax. American 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013). This permanency did 
not last long given that the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act has doubled the base estate and gift tax 
exemption amount (from $5 million to $10 million) from December 31, 2017 through 
January 1, 2026. Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054. 
 208. Gretchen McCulloch, Making “Fetch” Happen: What Makes New Words Catch 
On?, SLATE (May 1, 2014, 12:44 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/lexicon_valley/2014/05/ 
01/mean_girls_slang_fetch_10_years_later_why_it_didn_t_catch_on_according_to.html 
(“In the ten years since Mean Girls came out . . . the quote ‘stop trying to make fetch 
happen’ has achieved its own popularity as a means of mocking the out-of-touch.”); see also 
Olivia B. Waxman, The White House Made a Mean Girls Joke on Twitter and It Was 
Awesome, TIME (Aug. 13, 2013), http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/08/13/the-white-house-
made-a-mean-girls-joke-on-twitter-and-it-was-awesome/.  
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entrenchment: although these provisions sunset and expire, the practical 
effect is that high-earning taxpayers benefitting from these provisions will 
be motivated to bankroll candidates who commit to extending these 
provisions.
209
 There is immense pressure to extend temporary-effect 
legislation that reduces taxes, and this pressure creates political leverage in 
the future.
210
 Of course the downside of this political strategy, in the context 
of the estate tax, is that the temporary-effect legislation has created 
instability through uncertainty over the past decade that was sometimes 
paralyzing for estate planners.
211
  
There is no question that renewal uncertainty is a negative externality of 
temporariness and must be considered on balance. With regard to the home 
mortgage interest deduction, uncertainty is not a consideration upon which 
much time needs to be spent. The new caps upon the home mortgage 
interest deduction in the TCJA serve a signaling purpose: this deduction 
should no longer be counted upon when purchasing a home. And because 
the distribution of benefits from the deduction will prove to be shockingly 
regressive when data is released, it will be unconscionable to renew the 
home mortgage interest deduction in its present form—thus, renewal 
uncertainty ceases to become an issue. The law will either return to its pre-
TCJA form—a wasted opportunity—or it will be repealed.  
It is notable, however, that temporary-effect legislation has the potential 
to finally be utilized in the tax arena the way political theorists such as 
Thomas Jefferson envisioned: to dislodge an entrenched provision. We 
stand on the precipice of a “lawmaking moment,” which emphasizes the fact 
that effective tax reform hinges as much, if not more, on political 
acceptability as it does upon sound tax policy. One absurd possibility is that 
the new, regressive home mortgage interest deduction (as illustrated above) 
will be extended before 2026, coming at a substantial cost and offering no 
benefit to the lower and middle classes. Clinging to optimism and perhaps 
naiveté, the alternative is that the 2017 changes to the home mortgage 
interest deduction will prove to be a fascinating example of temporary-
                                                                                                                 
 209. Hacker & Pierson, supra note 27, at 59-62. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Brian J. O’Connor, Heirs Inherit Uncertainty with New Estate Tax, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/23/business/estate-tax-uncertainty.html 
(“Despite repeated attempts by conservative lawmakers to kill it—and a 2016 campaign-trail 
vow by Donald J. Trump that ‘no family will have to pay the death tax’ because ‘we will 
repeal it’—the estate tax remains a surprisingly resilient part of the United States tax 
code . . . [b]ut leaving the estate tax in place means America’s richest families now face the 
prospect of scurrying to tax lawyers to revise older estate plans, and may need to do so again 
before the end of 2025.”).  
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effect legislation as a retrenchment strategy to unwind deeply entrenched, 
bad tax policy.  
Over the next few years, and certainly before 2026, the time will be ideal 
to repeal the home mortgage interest deduction and replace it with the tax 
credit suggested in Section V.2. As the old adage goes, timing is 
everything. A tax credit offers more transparency to the public, as it can be 
easily explained as a dollar-for-dollar reduction of one’s tax liability. In 
many ways, it will make the Internal Revenue Code simpler—which seems 
to be a stated goal of almost every politician. The upside-down effect of 
deductions is avoided. A credit may also be easily tailored to provide 
targeted and meaningful tax relief to the income-level of taxpayer who is on 
the margin of owning versus renting. 
B. The Replacement of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 
It has been astutely observed that lawmaking moments are just that: 
fleeting moments that may swiftly pass.
212
 Understanding that the chess 
board has been set, and the moment is now, what plan should be 
implemented prior to January 1, 2026 with regard to the home mortgage 
interest deduction? This Article proposes a two-prong approach: first, the 
deduction itself should be eliminated from the Internal Revenue Code; 
second, a tax credit should be implemented that will provide targeted relief 
for low- and middle-income taxpayers. This two-prong approach would be 
the first step in a larger plan of assistance intended to assist homeowners,
213
 
with further assistance focused upon the emphasis of equity (as opposed to 
debt).
214
 
The repeal of the mortgage interest deduction would have little impact on 
low- and middle-income taxpayers who do not presently receive the benefit 
of the deduction anyways.
215
 The tax credit may be designed to continue to 
offer assistance to those middle-income taxpayers who benefit from it, 
while phasing out higher-income taxpayers. Utilizing a tax credit that is tied 
to homeownership—rather than the size of a homeowner’s mortgage 
                                                                                                                 
 212. Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the 
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1156 (2009).  
 213. Gubler, supra note 171, at 129 (“When forming policy under conditions of extreme 
uncertainty, the optimal approach seems to be a process by which the policy decision is 
divided into multiple stages, or in other words, an experimental approach.”).  
 214. To date, homeownership assistance programs have focused very little upon assisting 
the down payment-constraints. 
 215. Scott Greenberg, Who Itemizes Deductions?, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 22, 2016), 
https://taxfoundation.org/who-itemizes-deductions/. 
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indebtedness—will shift focus to the desired social outcome of 
homeownership, and reduce the incentive to over-borrow. For illustrative 
purposes, this Article utilizes a 0.5% tax credit based upon the purchase 
price of the home up to $500,000 (or $2500).
216
 It is possible to phase-out 
this credit for taxpayers with income above a threshold amount.  
The benefits of this solution can be seen when applied to the illustrations 
of Part III of this Article.  
Case 1: The High-Income Earner 
The Case 1 taxpayer (income of $214,463, home purchase price of $1.2 
million) was the only taxpayer who is in an income range where most 
taxpayers would itemize deductions and receive the benefit of the mortgage 
interest deduction, even in 2018, after the Tax Cuts and Jobs Acts of 2017 
limited the deduction. It is also worth noting that if a phase-out were to be 
incorporated into the proposed tax credit, it is unlikely that the Case 1 high-
income earner would receive the benefit of the credit. 
For the sake of discussion, assuming that the proposed tax credit is 
applied, the credit for this taxpayer is capped at $2500. The results are 
illustrated below. 
 
 
TAX 
LIABILITY 
NOTES 
EFFECTIVE 
TAX RATE 
ESTIMATED TAX 
LIABILITY IN 2018 
$40,158 
INCLUDES 
ITEMIZED MID 
OF $32,154 
18.72% 
APPLICATION OF 
PROPOSAL UNDER 
2018 CODE 
$44,182  
INCLUDES CREDIT 
OF $2,500 
20.60% 
APPLICATION OF 
PROPOSAL UNDER 
2017 CODE 
$48,370 
INCLUDES CREDIT 
OF $2,500 
22.55% 
                                                                                                                 
 216. See Jason J. Fichtner & Jacob Feldman, Reforming the Mortgage Interest Deduction 
(Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper No. 14-17, 2014), https://www.mercatus.org/publication/ 
reforming-mortgage-interest-deduction. 
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Temporary-enactment of the individual tax cuts under the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act of 2017 have created uncertainty in the future. If the 2018 rates 
and standard deduction amounts are extended, the proposed credit will 
increase the high-income earner’s liability from 18.72% to 20.60%. If the 
individual tax cuts are allowed to expire, and the tax rates and standard 
deduction return to 2017 levels on January 1, 2026, this taxpayer would pay 
an additional $6,914 ($41,456 with the home mortgage interest deduction; 
$48,370 with the proposed credit). 
Case 2: The Middle-Income Earner 
In Case 2, the middle-income earner (income of $66,739.20, home 
purchase price of $300,000) may apply a $1500 tax credit under this 
proposal. 
 
 
TAX 
LIABILITY 
NOTES 
EFFECTIVE 
TAX RATE 
ESTIMATED TAX 
LIABILITY IN 2018 
I$7,982 
INCLUDES 
$12,000 
STANDARD DED. 
11.96% 
APPLICATION OF 
PROPOSAL UNDER 
2018 CODE 
I$6,482  
INCLUDES CREDIT 
OF $1,500 
9.7% 
APPLICATION OF 
PROPOSAL UNDER 
2017 CODE 
I$8,324 
INCLUDES $6,350 
STANDARD DED. 
& $4,050 PE 
12.47% 
 
Temporary-enactment of the individual tax cuts under the TCJA have 
created uncertainty in the future. If the 2018 rates and standard deduction 
amounts are extended, the proposed credit will reduce the middle-income 
taxpayer’s liability from 11.96% to 9.66%. This is attributable to the fact 
that any benefit from the home mortgage interest deduction has been 
eliminated for this taxpayer because of the increased 2018 standard 
deduction amount. If the individual tax cuts are allowed to expire, and the 
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tax rates and standard deduction return to 2017 levels on January 1, 2026, 
this taxpayer would save $515 ($8,839 with the home mortgage interest 
deduction; $8,324 with the proposed credit).  
Case 3: The Middle-Income Earner: African American Male 
The African American middle-income earner of Case 3 (income of 
$53,391.36, home purchase price of $250,000) may apply a $1250 tax 
credit.  
 
 
 
TAX 
LIABILITY 
NOTES 
EFFECTIVE 
TAX RATE 
ESTIMATED TAX 
LIABILITY IN 2018 
I$5,046 
INCLUDES 
$12,000 
STANDARD DED. 
7.56% 
APPLICATION OF 
PROPOSAL UNDER 
2018 CODE 
I$3,796  
INCLUDES CREDIT 
OF $1,250 
5.68% 
APPLICATION OF 
PROPOSAL UNDER 
2017 CODE 
I$5,237 
INCLUDES $6,350 
STANDARD DED. 
& $4,050 PE 
7.84% 
 
Temporary-enactment of the individual tax cuts under the TCJA have 
created uncertainty in the future. If the 2018 rates and standard deduction 
amounts are extended, the proposed credit will reduce this taxpayer’s 
liability from 7.56% to 5.68%. This is attributable to the fact that any 
benefit from the home mortgage interest deduction has been eliminated for 
this taxpayer because of the increased 2018 standard deduction amount. If 
the individual tax cuts are allowed to expire, and the tax rates and standard 
deduction return to 2017 levels on January 1, 2026, this taxpayer would 
save $639 ($5,931 with the home mortgage interest deduction; $5,237 with 
the proposed credit).  
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Case 4: The Low-Income Earner 
In Case 4, the low-income earner (income of $33,369.60, home purchase 
price of $150,000) may apply a $750 tax credit. 
 
 
TAX 
LIABILITY 
NOTES 
EFFECTIVE 
TAX RATE 
ESTIMATED TAX 
LIABILITY IN 2018 
I$2,374 
INCLUDES 
$12,000 
STANDARD DED. 
7.11% 
APPLICATION OF 
PROPOSAL UNDER 
2018 CODE 
I$1,624  
INCLUDES CREDIT 
OF $750 AND 
$12,000 SD 
4.86% 
APPLICATION OF 
PROPOSAL UNDER 
2017 CODE 
I$2,229 
INCLUDES CREDIT 
OF $750, $6,350 
SD & $4,050 PE 
6.67% 
 
Temporary-enactment of the individual tax cuts under the TCJA has 
created uncertainty. If the 2018 rates and standard deduction amounts are 
extended, the proposed credit will reduce the low-income taxpayer’s 
liability from 7.11% to 4.86%. This is attributable to the fact that any 
benefit from the home mortgage interest deduction has been eliminated for 
this taxpayer because of the increased 2018 standard deduction amount. If 
the individual tax cuts are allowed to expire, and the tax rates and standard 
deduction return to 2017 levels on January 1, 2026, this taxpayer would 
save $750 ($2979 with the home mortgage interest deduction; $2229 with 
the proposed credit).  
The low-income earner is the taxpayer who will find himself with the 
most dramatic subsidy if the home mortgage interest deduction is repealed 
and replaced: it is highly unlikely that he itemizes—thus, he has never 
received any benefit from the home mortgage interest deduction. The credit 
proposal routes the most significant homeownership subsidy to the 
taxpayers most in need—those for whom a subsidy may make all the 
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difference in a decision to rent versus own—whether under the 2017 or the 
2018 Code.  
* * * * 
Though Democrats would likely use the expression “dumpster fire”217 to 
describe the TCJA, the legislation arguably sets the stage for repeal of a tax 
expenditure previously regarded as untouchable. As is illustrated above, 
only the high-income earner in Case 1 received a benefit from the home 
mortgage interest deduction prior to the enactment of the TCJA (“prior 
law”), and continues to receive a benefit when the new law is implemented 
in 2018 (“current law”). The Case 2 and Case 3 taxpayers will itemize their 
deductions to receive the benefit of the home mortgage interest deduction 
under prior law, but will not receive any benefit from the deduction under 
current law. The Case 4 taxpayer receives no benefit from the home 
mortgage interest deduction under prior or current law. Ironically, the Case 
4 taxpayer is the individual for whom a government subsidy in favor of 
homeownership may be most impactful. Because the TCJA has rendered 
the home mortgage interest deduction worthless for all but the high-income 
taxpayer of Case 1, implementing targeted relief through the proposed two-
prong plan will strip an entitlement from a taxpayer who is not in need of 
generous assistance.  
VI. Conclusion  
“Kicking the can down the road” is an adept and universally understood 
metaphor that may be used to describe the behavior of U.S. politicians on 
issues of great magnitude.
218
 Politically difficult choices are, unsurprisingly, 
difficult—and when faced with a deadline, politicians often seem to choose 
inaction or half-measures. It is easy to understand why kicking the can 
down the road is a maligned strategy, perhaps signaling the placement of 
self above country by politicians unwilling to commit to a politically 
                                                                                                                 
 217. Laurel Wamsley, A Phrase for Our Time: Merriam Webster Adds ‘Dumpster Fire’ 
to Dictionary, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 5, 2018, 16:32 PM ET) https://www.npr.org/ 
sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/05/590919849/a-phrase-for-our-time-merriam-webster-adds-
dumpster-fire-to-dictionary (referencing the Merriam-Webster definition: “an utterly 
calamitous or mismanaged situation or occurrence: disaster”). 
 218. James Hohmann & John F. Harris, 10 Quotes That Haunt Obama, POLITICO (Oct. 2, 
2012, 4:51 AM EDT), https://www.politico.com/story/2012/10/10-quotes-that-haunt-obama-
081895 (noting that, five days before taking office, President Obama emphatically declared, 
“What we have done is kicked this can down the road. We are now at the end of the road and 
are not in a position to kick it any further. We have to signal seriousness in this by making 
sure some of the hard decisions are made . . . .”).  
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unpopular path. This Article considers the recent changes to the home 
mortgage interest deduction as a potentially noteworthy use of temporary-
effect legislation in a politically polarized world, and identifies the value in 
using transition periods to shift norms and build consensus in an area of the 
law such as tax, which is dense and opaque, and sometimes best understood 
by the average voter in retrospect. Assuming that the preferences of the 
majority must be (or theoretically should be) reflected in legislative policy, 
temporary-effect tax legislation may be useful to retrench entrenched 
opinions of the majority.  
For decades, tax policy experts have agreed that the home mortgage 
interest deduction is a failure in tax policy: it disproportionately benefits 
higher-income taxpayers,
219
 has little impact on homeownership, and 
arguably raises home prices.
220
 Changes in the TCJA have created a 
hyperbolically-regressive version of the home mortgage interest deduction 
that must be reconsidered before its December 31, 2018 expiration. While 
temporariness will force reconsideration, it also allows for legislative 
drift—enabling legislators to implement a wholesale reshaping of 
homeownership subsidies while deftly sidestepping many of the costs that 
would otherwise be born from an attack upon a sacred cow tax provision. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 219. Victoria J. Haneman, A Timely Proposal to Eliminate the Student Loan Interest 
Deduction, 14 NEV. L.J. 156, 177-78 (2013) (“The deduction is indefensible from a 
distributional perspective, as only those taxpayers with enough income to itemize their 
deductions receive any benefit. Ironically, these same taxpayers are likely to buy a home 
without the assistance of a deduction, and thus the deduction merely rationalizes carrying 
more debt to buy larger homes.”).  
 220. See Mann, supra note 88, at 1396 (“The present form of the home mortgage interest 
deduction no longer supports the American Dream”); Morrow, supra note 120, at 822 
(alleging that the deduction “inflates housing prices, encourages excessive borrowing and 
contributes to instability in the real estate economy”); Jr., supra note 6, at 181 (stating that 
“[t]he macroeconomic effects of the MID are so destructive that every economist (excluding 
those employed by the housing industry) believes” that it needs to be repealed); see also 
Stephen C. Cecchetti & Kermit L. Schoenholtz, Why the Mortgage Interest Tax Deduction 
Should Disappear, but Won’t, MONEY & BANKING (June 8, 2015), http://www. 
moneyandbanking.com/commentary/2015/6/3/why-the-mortgage-interest-tax-deduction-
should-disappear-but-wont (criticizing the home mortgage interest deduction for “rais[ing] 
inequality and reduc[ing] economic efficiency”). See generally Andrew Hanson, Ike 
Brannon & Zackary Hawley, Rethinking Tax Benefits for Homeowners, NAT’L AFF., Spring 
2014, at 40, 41 (criticizing the mortgage interest deduction as “regressive”); William T. 
Mathias, Curtailing the Economic Distortions of the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 30 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 43 (1996) (arguing that the deduction must be eliminated or curtailed in 
size and scope). 
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